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ARTICLES 
THE PROS AND CONS OF POLITICALLY 
REVERSIBLE “SEMISUBSTANTIVE” 
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
Dan T. Coenen* 
Most observers of constitutional adjudication believe that it works in an 
all-or-nothing way.  On this view, the substance of challenged rules is of 
decisive importance, so that political decision makers may resuscitate 
invalidated laws only by way of constitutional amendment.  This conception 
of constitutional law is incomplete.  In fact, courts often use so-called 
“semisubstantive” doctrines that focus on the processes that nonjudicial 
officials have used in adopting constitutionally problematic rules.  When a 
court strikes down a rule by using a motive-centered or legislative-findings 
doctrine, for example, political decision makers may revive that very rule 
without need for a constitutional amendment.  For such an effort to 
succeed, however, those decision makers must comply with special, 
deliberation-enhancing procedural requirements crafted by courts to 
ensure that constitutional concerns receive fair attention in the lawmaking 
process. 
Is semisubstantive review legitimate and sensible?  In this Article, the 
author disentangles—and then responds to—each of ten critiques that 
judges and scholars have directed at semisubstantive decision making.  
While acknowledging that most of these critiques have some merit, the 
author concludes that courts should continue to deploy semisubstantive 
doctrines as one, but not the only, tool of constitutional review.  This 
approach, it is argued, serves a worthy aim.  It protects constitutional 
values in a meaningful way, while taking due account of the salience of 
republican self-rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “unelected federal judiciary” has taken blows from many critics, 
including unelected federal judges themselves.1  Most complaints proceed 
from the premise that courts make constitutional rulings that “withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy” by “plac[ing] 
them beyond the reach of majorities.”2  On this view, the substance of the 
challenged rule or practice is all-important.3  Teacher-led prayers in 
classrooms violate the Establishment Clause.4  Racially segregated 
education runs afoul of the equal protection guarantee.5  And bans on 
previability abortions offend protections of liberty embodied in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.6  Judicially recognized limits of this kind are 
“hard-and-fast” because the only way elected officials may undo them is by 
amending the U.S. Constitution.7 
It is not surprising that democracy-minded critics of the courts focus on 
these substance-centered prohibitions.  These prohibitions, after all, block 
elected decision makers from achieving legal outcomes that even large 
majorities of their constituents deem important.  It is for this reason that 
American constitutional law has a strong “countermajoritarian” cast.8 
Many constitutional rulings, however, do not concern only the 
substantive action the government has taken.  Rather, courts sometimes 
apply so-called “semisubstantive” doctrines, which take account of both the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[U]nelected federal judges have been usurping [Congress’s] lawmaking power . . . .”); see 
also John Gramm, Letter to the Editor, We Need to Pray for Our Elected Officials, THE 
PANTAGRAPH, Feb. 12, 2004, at A10 (“It’s certainly too bad that our nation has degenerated 
to the point that unelected officials in our government, especially in the judicial department 
and the higher court federal judge system, usurp authority that is unconstitutional and biased 
against religion.”). 
 2. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 3. See id. (suggesting that the “very purpose” of having constitutional rights is “to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to 
be applied by the courts”). 
 4. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
 5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954). 
 6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–53, 869–70 (1992). 
 7. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:  Protecting Fundamental Values 
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1578–80 
(2001) (describing content-centered nature of legislatively nonreversible constitutional rules) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8. The leading treatment of this subject is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).  In it, Professor 
Alexander Bickel describes the judicial-review-wielding U.S. Supreme Court as a “deviant 
institution in the American democracy.” Id. at 18. See generally Barry Friedman, The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:  The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998) (“The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has been the 
central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.”).  For two leading efforts to 
reconcile judicial review with democratic self-governance, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS (1991) and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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challenged rule’s substance and the process that brought the rule into effect.  
Consider the following examples: 
1. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,9 the 
U.S. Supreme Court overturned Congress’s effort to invoke 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity with regard to money-damages claims under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act.  In doing so, however, the 
Court did not foreclose the possibility that such an abrogation 
could take place.  Instead, it found that Congress had not 
“documented” constitutional violations that were sufficiently 
widespread to trigger its remedial Section 5 power.10  The 
implication of the Court’s analysis was clear:  if Congress could 
and did provide proper documentation, a new law that exactly 
replicated the one struck down in Garrett would survive 
constitutional attack.11 
2. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,12 the Court invalidated a 
municipal program under which all passing vehicles were stopped 
at fixed police checkpoints in an effort to thwart illegal drug use.  
In distinguishing earlier Fourth Amendment authorities that 
upheld similar “‘special needs’” searches, the Court deemed it 
determinative that local lawmakers’ “primary purpose was to 
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”13  Again, the 
implication of the Court’s reasoning was clear:  if the city 
reinstituted an identical checkpoint program, but did so for the 
proper purpose of getting dangerous drug-using drivers off the 
road, it would seem that the new program would  pass 
constitutional muster.14  Indeed, the majority in Edmond 
acknowledged that “a program impelled by licit purposes is 
permitted, even though the challenged conduct may be outwardly 
similar.”15 
 
 9. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 10. Id. at 372. 
 11. For a more detailed discussion of Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett, see for example William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record 
Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 117–19 (2001); Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, 
Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1281, 1325–26 (2002); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the 
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases:  An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1707, 1725–27 (2002). 
 12. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 13. Id. at 37–38. 
 14. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, Introduction:  2006 Fourth Amendment Symposium:   
Programmatic Purpose, Subjective Intent, and Objective Intent:  What Is the Proper Role of 
“Purpose” Analysis  To Measure the Reasonableness of a Search or Seizure?, 76 MISS. L.J. 
i, vii n.17 (2006) (“[N]othing in the Edmond Court’s analysis would prevent Indianapolis 
from simply re-labeling its program and conducting the same screening for drugs . . . .”). 
 15. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47; see also id. at 37–38 (distinguishing early ruling that 
upheld fixed checkpoints in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 
(1990), on the ground that that program “aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road”); 
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3. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,16 the Court considered whether a 
state could constitutionally extend sales-tax collection obligations 
to “a vendor whose only contacts with [it] are by mail or common 
carrier.”17  The Court overturned the challenged program, but was 
careful to base its ruling on the dormant Commerce Clause, and 
not the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18  The 
upshot was that the Court’s ruling—like all dormant Commerce 
Clause rulings—became reversible by way of ordinary 
congressional legislation, so that joint action by state and federal 
lawmakers could reinstate exactly the same rule the Court had just 
struck down.19  Indeed, the Court trumpeted this feature of its 
work, proclaiming that “Congress is now free to decide whether, 
when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-
order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”20 
In each of these cases, governmental processes had dispositive 
significance.  None of the cases, however, involved the application of 
traditional procedural due process principles, because those principles focus 
on process-related requirements in the adjudicative setting.  Put another 
way, the Court in Garrett, Edmond, and Quill did not direct attention to the 
processes by which discrete disputes were resolved; instead, it directed 
attention to the processes by which lawmakers promulgated rules of broad 
application because the substance of those rules raised a constitutional red 
flag.  As a consequence, in each of these cases, the Court made only a 
provisional move.  By focusing on the process that led to the law’s 
enactment, the Court signaled that exactly the same law or practice that the 
Court had found objectionable would survive constitutional attack if 
political authorities, in a second go-round, avoided the initial process error.  
Congress might make the findings deemed essential in Garrett; after 
Edmond, the City Council might reinstitute drug checkpoints by acting 
without an impermissible motive; and Congress might bless state efforts to 
impose the same nexus-stretching taxing scheme deemed unlawful in Quill.  
In short, process mattered no less than substance in these cases, which is 
 
id. at 47 n.2 (“[W]e need not decide whether the State may establish a checkpoint program 
with the primary purpose of checking . . . driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of 
interdicting narcotics.”); id. at 55–56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Indianapolis 
police had assigned a different purpose to their activity here, but in no way changed what 
was done on the ground to individual motorists, it might well be valid.”). 
 16. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 17. Id. at 311. 
 18. Id. at 318. 
 19. See, e.g., Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 
159, 174 (1985) (noting that combination of state and federal legislation defeated a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge to state exclusion of nonresident bank holding companies).  See 
generally DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 292–96 (2004); 
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-35, at 1242–45 (3d ed. 2000) 
(discussing congressional authorization of otherwise impermissible state regulation). 
 20. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. 
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why they involved “semisubstantive,” rather than fully substantive, 
doctrines of constitutional law.21 
Semisubstantive rules take many forms.  Indeed, in an earlier work I 
catalogued nine separate semisubstantive techniques, each of which has 
given rise to multiple subdoctrines.22  All of these rules share a democracy-
forcing, dialogic quality.23  In essence, nonjudicial authorities can dodge the 
constitutional trap if, but only if, they act in a way that gives focused 
attention to the important constitutional values raised by the challenged 
practice. 
To be sure, semisubstantive rules do not stand alone in constitutional law 
because nonsemisubstantive hard-and-fast rules continue to apply in many 
settings.24  In addition, semisubstantive review does not rear its head every 
time parties present constitutional claims; instead, it tends to surface only 
when particularly significant constitutional values are at play.25  None of 
 
 21. This type of review has received many names, such as “structural due process,” 
Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); “due 
process of lawmaking,” Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 
(1976); and “Type III judicial review,” Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term—
Foreword:  Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan 
Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 83 (1991).  I prefer “semisubstantive review” 
because (1) it directs attention to the substantive constitutional constraints that such review 
implicates, and (2) other labels—particularly labels that incorporate the term “due 
process”—improperly imply that this form of review derives exclusively or primarily from 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See infra notes 121–34 
and accompanying text (developing the idea that semisubstantive review does not derive 
solely, or primarily, from the Due Process Clauses). 
 22. The doctrinal categories are:  (1) rules of clarity; (2) form-based deliberation rules; 
(3) proper-findings-and-study rules; (4) representation-reinforcing structural rules; (5) time-
driven second-look rules; (6) thoughtful-treatment-of-the-area rules; (7) constitutional 
common-law and common-law-like rules; (8) proper-purpose rules; and (9) constitutional 
“who” rules. See generally Coenen, supra note 7, at 1587–805 (providing descriptions and 
examples of each form). 
 23. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword:  Leaving 
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 82 (1996) (noting that semisubstantive doctrines 
can “require[] state officials to set out criteria on their own and . . . in that way [be] 
democracy-forcing”; adding that these rules are “intended to catalyze and improve, rather 
than to preempt, democratic processes”).  It is important to recognize that semisubstantive 
review involves only one of several ways in which courts involve other arms of government 
in the elaboration of constitutional law.  For a helpful review of different dialogic 
approaches, see Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise:  Assessing the Normative Potential 
Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2006).  For a brief effort to 
locate semisubstantive decision making in the broader context of constitutional law in 
general and dialogic techniques in particular, see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1579–81. 
 24. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1579; see also supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text 
(discussing school prayer, race-segregation, and abortion cases). 
 25. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1585–86.  Some commentators have argued for a more 
across-the-board approach, at least with respect to certain forms of semisubstantive 
doctrines.  For a recent proposal that would render findings-and-study rules applicable to all 
federal legislation (not just legislation that raises particularly significant constitutional 
problems), see Victor Goldfeld, Note, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group 
Politics:  Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional 
Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 367 (2004).  For an argument that all judicial rulings of 
constitutional law should be reversible by ordinary legislation, see Kenneth Ward, 
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this changes the fact, however, that semisubstantive review has deep roots 
and broad effects within American law.26 
Given the pervasiveness of semisubstantive decision making, a simple 
question suggests itself:  is this form of judicial intervention legitimate and 
advisable?  No thorough treatment of this issue now exists, although 
commentators have raised many questions about this style of review.  
During the 1980s, for example, Professor Mark Tushnet voiced doubts 
about the semisubstantive methodology.27  His comments, however, 
focused on worries that this style of decision making might emerge as a 
grand theory of constitutional law28—a role for such decision making 
neither claimed by the Court nor advocated in this Article.29  Other 
treatments have aimed at smaller targets.  Professors Philip Frickey and  
Steven Smith have suggested, for example, that the sort of findings-related 
intervention exemplified by Garrett reflects an inattentiveness to the 
practical operation of a 535-member, two-house, committee-driven, 
logrolling-oriented Congress.30  These texts and others illuminate particular 
 
Legislative Overrides as a Check on Judicial Review (2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_ward/1/.  For one effort to build on the use of 
semisubstantive review in a particular doctrinal context, see David A. Sklansky, Quasi-
Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1292–99 
(2002) (advocating that courts “search for ways” to develop Constitution-based rules of 
criminal procedure that “minimize the dangers of intruding into decisions normally left to 
the political branches,” including through use of rules “‘reversible’ by the political 
branches”). 
 26. This style of decision making also pervades constitutional law on the international 
stage.  In Great Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, for example, “legislatures [possess] the 
power to have the final word on what the law is,” following judicial determinations of 
unconstitutionality. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 746 (2001). 
 27. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 201–13 (1988).  Professor Mark Tushnet has argued that semisubstantive review is 
“beset by several difficulties.” Id. at 206.  He has further noted that “proponents of structural 
review have failed to confine the Court’s discretion both in deciding when to invoke 
structural review and in deciding when its requirements are satisfied.” Id. at 208.  He finally 
concluded that “[s]tructural review may fail as a theory.” Id. at 213.  In the text, I 
specifically reference Professor Tushnet’s work “[d]uring the 1980s,” because in later years 
he seems to have seen greater value in judicial use of these doctrines. See Mark Tushnet, 
Subconstitutional Constitutional Law:  Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2001) (“Normatively, a combination of full democratic choice coupled 
with subconstitutional doctrines to ensure that such choice is informed, carefully made, and 
the like, might be more attractive than a system in which democratic choice is limited 
substantively by the courts.”). 
 28. See supra note 27. 
 29. Over the years, some commentators have endorsed politically reversible judicial 
review as a general theory, at least in specified fields, such as substantive due process. See 
generally Calabresi, supra note 21; Daniel O. Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights 
and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 9 (1985); Terrance 
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977).  For an 
approach to judicial review that would “allow Congress and the President to override judicial 
precedents through ordinary legislation,” see Ward, supra note 25, at 1.  
 30. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1755 (finding that the Court’s approach 
“lacks an adequate conceptualization of legislative actors, has an excessively narrow 
definition of the legislative record, and appears to reflect an inaccurate view of deliberation 
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pathways for challenging semisubstantive decision making.  None of them, 
however, provides anything that approaches a comprehensive catalogue of 
problems, much less a systematic set of responses. 
This Article offers a wide-ranging evaluation of the integrity and wisdom 
of semisubstantive rules.  In Part I, I document the nature and scope of this 
style of decision making, including by offering a typology of 
semisubstantive doctrines  built around so-called “how,” “why,” “when,” 
and “who” rules.  In Part II, I turn to the merits of the semisubstantive 
methodology by evaluating ten separate critiques.  Although most of these 
critiques have some force, I conclude that none of them justifies 
abandonment of this style of constitutional decision making.  There is much 
to be said, both pro and con, about the merits of semisubstantive review.  In 
the end, however, I conclude that nonexclusive use of these rules provides a 
valuable mechanism for promoting interbranch and federal-state dialogue 
while giving substantive constitutional values their due.31 
I.  THE FORMS OF SEMISUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
The Supreme Court has never sought to catalogue the many sorts of 
semisubstantive rules that it uses in constitutional cases.  Close analysis 
reveals, however, that these rules may be gathered into groupings that 
reflect the how, why, when, and who of the lawmaking process. 
“How” rules, such as the rule of Garrett, evaluate the manner in which a 
law came into being, including by looking at whether the lawmaking body 
made a focused assessment of the constitutional issues at stake.  “Why” 
rules, such as the Fourth Amendment doctrine of Edmond, consider whether 
an impermissible motive tainted the lawmaking process.  “When” rules 
focus on the impact of time in assessing constitutionality; in particular, an 
encounter with a law promulgated long ago may lead judges to force a 
legislative reappraisal in the absence of recent efforts at repeal or reform.  
“Who” rules focus on whether the best decision maker—a nationally-
minded Congress, rather than a locally-minded state legislature, as in Quill, 
for example—has signed off on the challenged practice.  Judicial use of 
each of these doctrines leaves the door open for the political branches to put 
 
and the legislative process”).  Other commentators have criticized findings-based rulings as 
well. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress:  The 
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 328, 331 (2001) (stating that the Court’s approach “is fundamentally ill 
advised”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 90–91 (asserting that the Court’s approach 
“demonstrates judicial suspicion of congressional motives” and has “no support in precedent 
or in constitutional text or structure”); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 85 (2001) (raising the concern that the “[Court’s] record requirement 
could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation ”); see 
also Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 412–20 (describing objections to court-imposed “legislative 
due process” rules). 
 31. For a truncated enumeration of arguments for semisubstantive review, see Coenen, 
supra note 7, at 1834–45. 
COENEN FINAL 4/26/2009  8:59:52 PM 
2009] “SEMISUBSTANTIVE” CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 2843 
in place legal rules that would not satisfy the courts if enacted by way of 
ordinary lawmaking processes. 
A.  Constitutional “How” Rules 
“How” rules do not deem determinative the “what” of a challenged 
law—that is, the content of the law’s substantive restriction.  Rather, they 
focus on how the law came to be.  As a result, as with other semisubstantive 
doctrines, when a court invalidates a law (or deems it inapplicable to the 
situation at hand) by using a constitutional “how” rule, the legislature 
remains free to readopt it (or render it applicable to the situation at hand) if 
it corrects judicially identified shortcomings in the lawmaking process.32 
How-based review often entails judicial use of constitutionally inspired 
“clear statement” rules,33 as illustrated by Solid Waste Agency v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers.34  There, the Court considered whether the 
Army Corps of Engineers had acted properly when it blocked the filling of 
a local rain-collecting sand and gravel pit.35  In taking this action, the Corps 
relied on its “Migratory Bird Rule,” which in essence required federal 
approval to tamper with any body of water frequented by migrating ducks 
and geese.36  The landowners’ challenge raised two questions:  (1) whether 
the Corps had exceeded its statutory authority under the Clean Water Act to 
regulate “‘waters of the United States’” by interpreting the Act to cover 
“isolated, intrastate” ponds, and (2) whether Congress had power under the 
Commerce Clause to grant the Agency this scope of regulatory 
jurisdiction.37 
The Court determined that the Corps’s view of its authority reached too 
far as a matter of statutory law, thereby avoiding the constitutional 
question.38  In steering this course, the Court relied on the principle that 
“[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer 
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress 
intended that result.”39  The Court also cited a second clear-statement rule 
that focused on the constitutional importance of state autonomy.  According 
to the Court, judicial concerns are “heightened where the administrative 
interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal 
 
 32. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1287 (describing constitutional “how” rules). 
 33. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 355–82 (2d ed. 2006).  The authors discuss substantive canons, including 
those that “correlate with basic values embedded in the Constitution,” id. at 357, and 
consider in detail the preference for avoiding serious constitutional questions, as well as 
federalism-driven canons, which seem designed to encourage Congress to “deliberate 
carefully about . . . intrusions upon core state functions.” Id. at 358. 
 34. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 35. Id. at 162–63. 
 36. Id. at 163–65. 
 37. Id. at 163–66, 169 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006)). 
 38. Id. at 162. 
 39. Id. at 172. 
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encroachment upon a traditional state power.”40  Because “[p]ermitting 
respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats . . . would 
result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary 
power over land and water use”41—and because Congress had not 
expressed a “clear” desire “to readjust the federal-state balance in this 
manner”—the Court overturned the Corps’s federal licensing scheme.42 
In relying on Congress’s lack of clarity with regard to authorizing the 
Migratory Bird Rule, the Court protected the constitutional value of 
federalism.  At the same time, the Court did not foreclose the possibility 
that Congress could reinstate the rule, so long as it abided by the Court’s 
how-based mandate that it speak in unambiguous terms.  In this way, the 
Court protected an important substantive constitutional value while 
permitting Congress to continue to explore the justifiability of this form of 
federal regulation. 
A different sort of “how” rule proved decisive in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma.43  That case presented the question whether the execution of 
murderers who were younger than sixteen at the time of the offense violated 
the Eighth Amendment.44  Three members of the Court, led by Justice 
Scalia, concluded that no constitutional rule barred the death sentence in 
these circumstances, in part because many states had long authorized the 
practice.45  Four members of the Court, led by Justice Stevens, reasoned 
that “‘evolving standards of decency’” rendered this sort of state action 
unconstitutional.46  Justice O’Connor supplied the decisive vote to block the 
execution by relying on a how-based semisubstantive rationale.47 
Accepting the premise of Justice Stevens’s approach, Justice O’Connor 
first noted that an emerging national consensus might preclude the 
execution of Thompson and others like him.48  Unsatisfied with the 
evidence on that point,49 however, she took an admittedly “unusual” 
approach to the case.50  Justice O’Connor emphasized that the Oklahoma 
legislature had never directly approved the execution of juvenile offenders 
in a focused way.51  Instead, the defendant was death-eligible because of 
the joint operation of two separate provisions—one that authorized the 
death penalty for adult offenders, and another that permitted trying juvenile 
offenders as adults for a variety of crimes.52  In Justice O’Connor’s view, 
 
 40. Id. at 173. 
 41. Id. at 174. 
 42. Id. at 172, 174. 
 43. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 44. Id. at 818–19. 
 45. Id. at 859–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 821 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 47. Id. at 848–59 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy did not participate in the 
Thompson v. Oklahoma decision. Id. at 838.  
 48. Id. at 848–49. 
 49. Id. at 849. 
 50. Id. at 858. 
 51. Id. at 857. 
 52. Id. 
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imposing the death sentence in these circumstances offended the Court’s 
“important and consistent” demand “for special care and deliberation in 
decisions that may lead to the imposition of that sanction.”53  As she 
explained, 
Because it proceeded in this manner, there is a considerable risk that the 
Oklahoma Legislature either did not realize that its actions would have the 
effect of rendering 15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not give 
the question the serious consideration that would have been reflected in 
the explicit choice of some minimum age for death eligibility.54 
Put another way, the state could not impose a death sentence in Thompson 
because its legislature had not acted with sufficient particularity and care.  
For Justice O’Connor (herself a former state senator), how the legislature 
had proceeded was determinative, regardless of whether the execution of 
youthful murderers was substantively prohibited by the Eighth Amendment 
in a hard-and-fast way.55 
Justice Scalia rejected this rationale in no-nonsense terms.  He observed 
that he knew of “no authority whatever for our specifying the precise form 
that state legislation must take, as opposed to its constitutionally required 
content.”56  In his view, Justice O’Connor’s “brand new principle” was a 
“loose cannon” that struck at the heart of state sovereignty.57  But Justice 
Scalia’s critique fell on deaf ears; Justice O’Connor’s semisubstantive 
methodology in fact provided the key fifth vote for overturning 
Thompson’s death sentence. 
As Garrett illustrates, some “how” rules target statutes put in place 
without adequate findings or study.  In United States v. Lopez,58 for 
example, the Court invalidated a federal ban on gun possession near schools 
on the ground that it reached beyond Congress’s commerce power.59  In 
doing so, the Court noted that the legislative record contained no 
explanation of the connection between this form of gun possession and the 
operation of interstate markets.60  The Court acknowledged that “Congress 
normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial 
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.”61  Yet it also observed 
that “we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even 
congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate 
 
 53. Id. at 856. 
 54. Id. at 857. 
 55. Notably, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Thompson does not stand alone in using this 
sort of extra-super-clear-statement rule. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1308–13 (discussing 
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion on congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity in 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 99–109 (2000), and its similarities to the 
Thompson concurrence). 
 56. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876–77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 877. 
 58. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 59. Id. at 551–52. 
 60. Id. at 562. 
 61. Id. 
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commerce.”62  Applying these principles, the Court declared, “to the extent 
that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative 
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate 
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked 
eye, they are lacking here.”63 
Some findings-or-study rules involve individual rights, rather than 
federal powers.  In Reno v. ACLU,64 for example, the Court considered 
whether the broad restriction on “indecent” Internet speech imposed by the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) ran afoul of the First Amendment.65  
The Court’s analysis focused on whether this prohibition was “carefully 
tailored” with respect to the goal of protecting minors in light of the 
possible adequacy of less restrictive regulatory approaches.66  In the end, 
the Court found a First Amendment violation, emphasizing that 
“[p]articularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the 
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we 
are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has 
any meaning at all.”67  This First Amendment findings-or-study rule does 
not stand alone.  In an earlier decision invalidating a broad “dial-a-porn” 
prohibition, the Court likewise reasoned that “the congressional record 
contains no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 563.  Building on United States v. Lopez, many lower court judges deemed the 
presence or absence of findings decisive in assessing commerce-power cases. See, e.g., 
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 292 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (voting to 
invalidate federal ban on machine gun possession as exceeding Congress’s commerce power, 
but noting that he “would view this case differently if Congress as a whole or even one of the 
responsible congressional committees had made a finding that intrastate machine gun 
possession, by facilitating the commission of certain crimes, has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce”); see also id. at 279 (majority opinion) (reasoning that, “unlike the 
situation in Lopez, there are legislative findings,” although made in connection with earlier 
firearms legislation).  In its post-Lopez decision in United States v. Morrison, a five-Justice 
majority of the Court invalidated a law that created a federal action for sex-based violence 
notwithstanding the existence of extensive congressional findings that such action, in the 
aggregate, substantially harms interstate commerce. 529 U.S. 598, 601–02, 614 (2000).  The 
four dissenters sought to distinguish Lopez on precisely this ground. Id. at 628–29 (Souter, 
J., dissenting).  And the majority itself did not foreclose the possibility that congressional 
findings might prove important in other commerce-power cases, particularly cases not 
involving violent crime.  As the Court noted, “the existence of congressional findings is not 
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.” Id. at 
614 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  The majority also declined to “adopt a categorical 
rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity” for analysis under the 
affecting-commerce prong of the commerce-power, id. at 613, thereby giving the Court 
“room to give weight to the presence or absence of legislative findings in some future 
commerce power cases,” Coenen, supra note 11, at 1322. 
 64. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 65. See id. at 870–71. 
 66. Id. at 871. 
 67. Id. at 879. 
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there is no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total 
ban, to achieve the Government’s interest in protecting minors.”68 
Two other constitutional “how” rules sometimes make an appearance.  
On occasion, courts apply constitutionally inspired rules that are 
legislatively reversible because of their “common-law-like” nature.  By way 
of example, rules that limit what instructions and inquiries judges may pose 
to deadlocked criminal juries appear to meet this description.69  In other 
cases, courts deploy so-called “form-based . . . rules.”70  In applying the 
dormant Commerce Clause, for example, the Court has routinely 
invalidated tax breaks that favor local businesses without questioning the 
constitutionality of affirmative subsidies that have identical economic 
effects.71  What is more, judicial recognition of this distinction between tax 
breaks and subsidies has its roots in semisubstantive reasoning.  As one 
court has explained, because an outright subsidy “involves the direct 
transfer of public monies,” it is “subject to heightened political visibility” 
and resulting incentives for care when the legislature acts.72 
 
 68. Sable Commc’ns of Ca., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989).  Something like the 
flipside of this reasoning played a role in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Ashcroft 
v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 591 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  There, four 
members of the Court voted to uphold more limited Internet-pornography legislation passed 
in the wake of Reno v. ACLU. Id. at 566.  In his critical, fifth-vote concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy observed, 
Congress and the President were aware of our decision, and we should assume that 
in seeking to comply with it they have given careful consideration to the 
constitutionality of the new enactment.  For these reasons, even if this facial 
challenge appears to have considerable merit, the Judiciary must proceed with 
caution and identify overbreadth with care before invalidating the Act. 
Id. at 591–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Notwithstanding its rejection of an overbreadth 
challenge in Ashcroft I, the Court later, in Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656 
(2004), upheld a U.S. district court’s preliminary injunction of the Act based on findings that 
a less restrictive alternative, in the form of parental installation of filtering software, 
remained available.  In dissent, Justice Breyer asked pointedly, “[W]hat has happened to the 
‘constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures’ that ‘is an integral and 
admirable part of the constitutional design’?” Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004)).  As Justice Breyer elaborated, “Congress 
read Reno with care.  It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that would meet each 
and every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in Reno. . . . What else 
was Congress supposed to do?” Id. at 690. 
 69. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1738 (discussing cases). 
 70. Id. at 1642. See generally id. at 1640–55 (discussing use of form-based rules to 
foster deliberative policymaking).   
 71. For some additional rules of this nature, see Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi 
Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 109–14 (2005) (holding that application of rules designed to protect 
sovereignty of Native American tribes hinges on whether “legal incidence” of state sales-
related fuel tax, as revealed by statutory phrasing, falls on off-reservation distribution, rather 
than on-reservation purchases), and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 
U.S. 450, 460 (1995) (“[I]f a State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of 
the impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift 
the tax’s legal incidence.”). 
 72. Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 
1125, 1137 (M.D. La. 1995).  Another sort of “how” rule is the “thoughtful treatment of the 
area” rule. Coenen, supra note 7, at 1727–34 (discussing thoughtful-treatment rules with 
regard to death penalty, speech-licensing, vagueness, and punitive-damages law).  For one 
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B.  Constitutional “Why” Rules 
Many doctrines of constitutional law focus on the purpose with which the 
lawgiver acted.  In Washington v. Davis,73 for example, the Court held that 
even facially neutral laws will trigger heightened scrutiny if they are 
adopted with the purpose of disadvantaging a racial minority or other 
protected group.74  In similar fashion, the Establishment Clause mandates 
invalidation of laws enacted with a sectarian motive.75  As illustrated by 
Edmond, the Fourth Amendment has spawned its own semisubstantive 
“why” rule.76  Still other motive-centered doctrines lurk in the Court’s free 
speech, free exercise, dormant Commerce Clause, and Bill of Attainder 
cases,77 as well as in other constitutional fields.78 
Rules of this kind are semisubstantive in nature for a simple reason:  their 
logic dictates that exactly the same law will or will not be constitutional 
depending on the mental process that led to its adoption.79  Hunter v. 
Underwood80 illustrates the point.  There, the Court encountered an 
Alabama law that disenfranchised any person who had committed a crime 
involving moral turpitude.81  The Court struck down this facially neutral 
exclusion on equal protection grounds because it had been promulgated 
with the purpose of keeping African Americans off the voting rolls.82  In 
invalidating the measure, however, the Court was careful to leave open the 
question “whether [it] would be valid if enacted today without any 
impermissible motivation.”83  The Court thus shifted the “burden of 
inertia”84 back to state lawmakers who might try to put the provision back 
in place, but only if they could do so in a process purged of racial bias. 
 
example, see Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1275–76 (noting that “[i]n a few limited areas, the 
Court has indicated that searches and seizures may satisfy the Fourth Amendment in part 
because they are carried out pursuant to formal regulations” and discussing inventory and 
administrative searches as examples). 
 73. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 74. Id. at 242. 
 75. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–60 (1985) (invalidating required 
meditation in schools because of improper purpose); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 
(1971). 
 76. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1759–61. 
 78. See id. at 1761 & nn.786 & 788. 
 79. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:  An Approach to the Problem of 
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 115 (noting that purpose-based 
doctrines permit reenactment of law “in identical form”); J. Morris Clark, Legislative 
Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 1033 
(1978) (same). 
 80. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
 81. Id. at 223. 
 82. Id. at 233. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See infra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Constitutional “When” Rules 
Thoughtful commentators have raised the question whether courts, at 
least sometimes, should force legislatures to reconsider long-surviving 
statutes that appear to have outlived their usefulness.85  More particularly, if 
old statutes implicate particularly significant constitutional concerns, courts 
might invoke semisubstantive “when” rules to force a legislative 
reappraisal.86  Are courts open to using this technique?  Some cases suggest 
they may be. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut,87 the Court confronted a state ban on 
contraceptive use, which had been adopted in 1879 based in part on the 
view that nonreproductive sexual intercourse is morally wrong.88  This 
potential justification for the law was brushed aside by the Court in 
Griswold because (according to Justice White’s concurrence) counsel in the 
case offered “no serious contention that Connecticut [thought] the use 
of . . . contraception [was] immoral.”89  This mode of analysis raises an 
obvious question:  what if, following the Court’s invalidation of the 
Connecticut statute, state legislators reenacted the same law and specifically 
relied on the immorality of nonprocreative sex?  In effect, by dismissing 
this justification as out-of-date, the Court left open the possibility that the 
state could reinstate the statute and defend it on this previously 
unconsidered ground.  Put another way, the Court invited the legislature to 
revive an old justification for an old statute, but only if a new legislature in 
new conditions concluded that the justification had merit.90 
Related to this type of no-longer-advanced-justification reasoning is the 
“concept of desuetude,”91 which courts sometimes use to invalidate laws 
that have generated few prosecutions over an extended period of time.92  
This doctrine has not taken firm hold in American jurisprudence.93  
Professor Cass Sunstein has suggested, however, that it provides the best 
way to view the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the state sodomy ban at 
 
 85. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 135 (photo. 
reprint 1999) (1982) (“[I]t is possible that a code can become so out of phase with everything 
else in the law that a forced legislative reconsideration becomes appropriate.”). 
 86. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1698–726 (analyzing judicial use of time-driven 
second-look rules when evaluating regulations that “raise particularly serious constitutional 
concerns”).  
 87. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 88. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 298–303 (discussing this aspect of Griswold). 
 89. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring). 
 90. For another case of this sort, see Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 641 n.9 (1974) (invalidating ban on teaching by women who were more than four 
months pregnant where the rule’s defenders did not contend that its original purpose of 
shielding schoolchildren from visibly pregnant women could support the challenged policy 
in the present day). 
 91. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 148. 
 92. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1704–08. 
 93. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification:  Guido Calabresi’s Uncommon 
Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1132 n.14 (1982). 
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issue in Lawrence v. Texas.94  As he put the point in discussing the 
interpretive philosophy he describes as “minimalism,” 
 Minimalists insist that the real problem in Lawrence, and in many 
other cases involving sexual privacy, was procedural.  In the last decades, 
sodomy prosecutions have been rare and unpredictable, simply because 
the public would not stand for many of them.  Emphasizing this point, 
minimalists contend that Lawrence, and many of the Court’s privacy 
decisions, should be understood as an American variation on the old 
English idea of desuetude.  According to that idea, laws lapse, and can no 
longer be enforced, when their enforcement has already become 
exceedingly rare because the principle behind them has become 
hopelessly out of step with people’s convictions.95 
As Professor Alexander Bickel explained many years earlier, the effect of a 
ruling based on the doctrine of desuetude is not to foreclose democratic 
action.  Rather, it is “to turn the thrust of forces favoring and opposing the 
present objectives of the statute toward the legislature, where the power of 
at least initial decision properly belongs in our system.”96  In other words, 
popular forces—if strong enough—can breathe new life into an old 
provision by pushing political authorities to return it to active duty.97 
“When” rules—like “what” and “how” rules—protect fundamental 
constitutional values because they result in the invalidation of 
constitutionally troublesome laws.  At the same time, this form of 
invalidation invites a legislative reprise so long as lawmakers act with care.  
In voting to strike down New York’s ban on assisted suicide, for example, 
Judge Guido Calabresi took precisely this approach.  He began by 
explaining that “[t]he statutes at issue were born in another age” and that 
“the bases of [them] have been deeply eroded over the last hundred and 
fifty years.”98  For these reasons, he declared that the assisted suicide ban 
could not continue to operate.  At the same time, he chose to “leave open 
the question of whether, if the [S]tate of New York were to enact new laws 
prohibiting assisted suicide (laws that either are less absolute in their 
 
 94. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 95. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES:  WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA 97 (2005) (footnote omitted); see also Sunstein, supra note 23, at 68 
(asserting that the Court’s earlier sodomy case, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 
“should have been decided . . . the other way and very narrowly—as a case involving the old 
and nicely minimalist idea, with democratic foundations, of desuetude”). 
 96. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 148. 
 97. A related time-tied style of judicial intervention is illustrated by the Court’s death 
penalty decisions.  In particular, when the Court invalidated every death penalty statute in 
the nation in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), it did so in light of “evolving 
standards of decency” as required by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  This result, however, 
triggered a widespread reexamination of the death penalty, culminating in its reenactment in 
many states and the Court’s upholding of that action in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976). 
 98. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), 
rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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application or are identical to those before us), such laws would stand or 
fall.”99   
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld assisted suicide restrictions, with 
its principal decision coming in a case from Washington State.100  Even as 
the Court sustained the Washington statute, however, it made a nod in the 
direction of constitutional “when” rules.  In particular, the Court 
emphasized that “[t]hough deeply rooted, the States’ assisted-suicide bans 
have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed.”101  The 
Court also catalogued recent developments in Washington itself, noting the 
state’s focused reevaluation of its assisted suicide ban in 1975 and its 
considered exclusion of the practice from actions authorized by the state’s 
Natural Death Act twenty years later.102  Given these elements of the 
Court’s reasoning, the question arises whether it would have jettisoned the 
Washington law had no such recent reappraisals occurred.  There is no way 
to know the answer to this question.  Were the Court to give these matters 
decisive weight, however, it would be applying a semisubstantive “when” 
rule.103 
D.  Constitutional “Who” Rules 
Finally, there are constitutional “who” rules, which steer policy choices 
from one nonjudicial decision maker to another.  Quill and other dormant 
Commerce Clause cases illustrate this approach by requiring 
congressional—rather than merely state—endorsement of laws that threaten 
the free flow of interstate and international commerce.104  Another leading 
who-rule case is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.105  There, the Court 
invalidated a ban on government employment of resident aliens that had 
been promulgated by the Federal Civil Service Commission.106  In the 
course of its decision, the Court first identified the interests advanced in 
support of the prohibition, which included maximizing the President’s 
power in treaty negotiations and encouraging aliens to become American 
citizens.107  According to the Court, these interests might have supported 
the rule had it come from Congress or the President.108  The Civil Service 
Commission, however, was not the proper body to assess these 
considerations because it had no responsibility for foreign affairs or 
 
 99. Id. at 732. 
 100. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 101. Id. at 716 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 716–17. 
 103. For a twist on the typical application of “when” rules, see Nickolai G. Levin, 
Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1281 (2003) (arguing that applications of 
statutes should change as constitutional doctrine changes, without necessitating judicial 
negation of such statutes). 
 104. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 105. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 106. Id. at 116–17. 
 107. Id. at 104. 
 108. Id. at 105. 
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naturalization policies.109  Put more bluntly, given the important equal 
protection values at stake in the case, the Court concluded that the 
Commission was not a proper “who” for the purpose of promulgating the 
hiring ban.110   
Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke111 brought a similar style of analysis to bear.  In voting 
to strike down a state medical school’s affirmative-action admissions 
program, he reasoned in part that nonjudicial efforts aimed at remedying 
past constitutional wrongs should come from broadly accountable state 
authorities, rather than “isolated” university officials.112  This result made 
sense, according to Justice Powell, because university officials have 
responsibility for “education, not the formulation of any legislative policy 
or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality.”113  In his view, 
“isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to 
make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and 
legislatively determined criteria.”114 
As Mow Sun Wong and Bakke show, “who” rules differ from other 
semisubstantive doctrines because they do not result in a remand to the 
same decision maker who propounded the suspect policy in the first place.  
Instead, they channel authority to a different set of decision makers who are 
perceived to be more deliberative, more competent, or more accountable.  
As with other semisubstantive doctrines, however, “who” rules permit 
political actors to put back in place the identical rule that the Court has 
struck down.  Indeed, with little delay, President Gerald Ford reinstated by 
executive order the very same alien hiring ban that the Court had 
invalidated in Mow Sun Wong.115  Subsequent judicial decisions upholding 
this action powerfully illustrate the self-limiting and dialogic nature of 
semisubstantive constitutional doctrines.116 
 
 109. Id. at 114. 
 110. Id. “Who” rules sometimes come to the fore in joint operation with other 
semisubstantive doctrines.  In Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001), for example, the Court noted its view that an administrative interpretation 
of a statute that comes too close to the outer bounds of congressional power would require a 
clear indication from Congress that such a result was intended. Id. at 172; see supra notes 
33–42 and accompanying text.  Although the Court in Solid Waste Agency thus protected 
federalism values by relying on a clear-statement “how” rule, it did so in a way that 
effectively shifted policymaking authority from one set of decision makers (that is, an 
executive agency) to another (that is, Congress). 
 111. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 112. Id. at 307–10. 
 113. Id. at 309. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R. § 7.3 (2008). 
 116. See, e.g., Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 1980); Vergara 
v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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II.  THE MERITS OF SEMISUBSTANTIVE RULES 
Legal analysts have not systematically examined the legitimacy and 
wisdom of semisubstantive rules.  Some judicial opinions—such as Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Thompson—suggest lines of criticism,117 and academic 
commentators have raised many challenges as well.118  Different observers 
are sure to characterize available critiques in different ways.  According to 
my count, however, there are ten key assertions:  (1) there is no legitimate 
constitutional source for semisubstantive rules; (2) at the least, these rules 
are at odds with an “originalist” methodology; (3) these rules are not 
confinable because they lack a limiting principle; (4) semisubstantive rules 
threaten legislative processes in a manner inconsistent with the separation 
of powers and our legal traditions; (5) such rules encourage judicial 
overreaching by giving a false impression of judicial restraint; (6) these 
rules invite judicial corruption of otherwise useful restraints like the 
vagueness doctrine; (7) the employment of semisubstantive rules is 
inherently futile; (8) the use of these rules risks underenforcement of 
constitutional norms; (9) semisubstantive rules reflect unrealistic 
assumptions about political processes; and (10) semisubstantive rules, in 
any event, lack a proper precedential pedigree. 
In the pages that follow, I elaborate and evaluate each of these lines of 
challenge.119  The task is large, and much must go unsaid.  In particular, 
semisubstantive doctrines differ from one another in important ways, and 
this treatment focuses on relevant differences only in some respects.120  
Even so, what is said here supports the argument  that courts should 
continue to use a wide range of semisubstantive safeguards as one vehicle 
for vindicating substantive constitutional protections. 
I turn now to the ten critiques. 
 
 117. See supra notes 45, 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 119. In an earlier article, I identified most of these critiques in an abbreviated form. See 
Coenen, supra note 7, at 1845–50.  In a responsive essay, Professor Tushnet observed that “a 
more complete understanding of [these] doctrines will require us to grapple with . . . 
objections that Professor Coenen mentions largely in passing.” Tushnet, supra note 27, at 
1872.  Professor Tushnet was right.  Hence, this Article. 
 120. I note, however, that those respects are significant.  In particular, I give focused 
attention to both constitutional “who” rules and semisubstantive findings-and-study rules in 
assessing Argument 9. See infra notes 299–328 and accompanying text.  It also bears 
emphasis that some semisubstantive doctrines cut across different substantive areas of 
constitutional law.  Legislative-findings rules, for example, have surfaced in cases involving 
the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the commerce power, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1718–27.  It is 
always open to debate whether such rules should apply in some substantive contexts, but not 
in others. 
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A.  Argument 1 (Illegitimacy):  Semisubstantive Rules Are Illegitimate 
Because They Lack a Proper Source in Constitutional Text or Accepted 
Postulates of Constitutional Decision Making 
Among the many questions raised about semisubstantive rules, the most 
fundamental is the first.  The question is:    from where do these rules 
come?  The answer is almost tautological:  semisubstantive safeguards 
emanate from those substantive rights that they seek to safeguard in 
semisubstantive ways.  There is, of course, no “semisubstantive rules” 
clause in the Constitution, although there are Due Process Clauses that 
might well serve to justify use of these process-centered doctrines.121  Some 
cases, however, raise questions about the due-process rationale122 and—
even more important—there is no need to travel the due-process route.  The 
reason why is simple:  the substantive rights at issue in constitutional cases 
adequately justify application of semisubstantive constitutional rules.123 
In all of the cases we have looked at, this connection is self-evident.  
Reno v. ACLU124 is a free speech case; Griswold125 concerns the right of 
privacy; Bakke126 involves equal protection; and so on.  There is no express 
reference to semisubstantive rules in the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments.  But so what?  There is nothing in the language of those 
amendments about such settled constitutional concepts as “public 
 
 121. It bears emphasis, in this regard, that the courts have invalidated many legislative 
acts on the ground that those acts do not comport with so-called “substantive due process.” 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1992) (“‘[I]t is 
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of 
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.’” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 467 
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision as one harkening 
back to the days of “substantive due process”).  Yet, if the Due Process Clauses impose 
substantive restraints on legislative behavior, should it not follow a fortiori that—at least 
with highly sensitive constitutional settings—they impose process-based limits as well? See, 
e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I see no 
reason why the character of [congressional] procedures may not be considered relevant to 
the decision whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or property 
without due process of law.”); Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 393 (relying on Due Process 
Clauses for procedural safeguards embedded in study-and-findings rules); see also Mich. 
Cent. R.R. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 294 (1906) (leaving as an open question, with who-rule 
dimension, whether grant of legislative power to the executive or judiciary would “work . . . 
a denial of due process”). 
 122. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) 
(suggesting that due process protections may not apply to legislative actions); see also Mark 
S. Kende, Comment, Principles of Competence:  The Ability of Public Institutions to Adopt 
Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 607 (1986) (noting the 
distinction between legislative and adjudicative actions with respect to due process 
requirements). 
 123. But see Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2781, 2796 (2003) (questioning the basis for deciding which substantive values are 
“‘distinctively deserving of [the] judicial protection’” of provisional review (quoting 
Coenen, supra note 11, at 1283)). 
 124. 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 125. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 126. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
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forums,”127 multifactor or “total deprivation” regulatory-takings review,128 
or “suspect classifications” and differing tiers of judicial scrutiny.129  The 
fact is that the terse texts of the Constitution must be—and thus have 
been—elaborated through the development of subsidiary doctrines built on 
the deeper values that underlie those texts.  Many of these doctrines have a 
“prophylactic” quality in the sense that they protect potentially 
underenforced constitutional values in a practical way.130  So it is with 
semisubstantive rules. 
Consider the basic notion of “heightened scrutiny” that pervades First 
Amendment, right-to-privacy, and both classification-based and 
fundamental-rights-based equal protection jurisprudence.131  The 
Constitution itself nowhere refers to heightened scrutiny.  Given the settled 
recognition of this style of review, however, the Court has had no choice 
but to develop sensible subrules to give the notion meaning and effect.  As a 
result, the Court has created rubrics—focusing on such matters as 
“important” or “compelling” government interests, “less restrictive 
alternatives,” and “narrowly tailored” laws—that accommodate 
constitutional doctrine to underlying policy and institutional concerns.132  In 
turn, the Court must give content to these subrules, and there is no apparent 
reason why that content may not take the form of semisubstantive doctrines.  
If the Court insists, for example, that legislative means must be “carefully 
tailored” to take account of legislative ends,133 there is no reason why 
courts must measure carefulness solely by looking to substantive outcomes, 
without considering actual procedural carefulness itself.134  From this 
 
 127. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 
(1992) (discussing forum-based approach in analyzing speech restrictions). 
 128. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (discussing 
total deprivation of economic use as taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124–28 (1978) (discussing factors to consider when determining whether just 
compensation is due for regulatory taking when no per se taking is present). 
 129. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985) 
(explaining levels of scrutiny applicable to equal protection challenges). 
 130. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190  
(1988) (discussing use of prophylactic rules in constitutional law, including in First 
Amendment and equal protection contexts). 
 131. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-26, at 1011–15, § 
15-9, at 1329–32, §§ 16-5 to 16-13, at 1451–66 (2d ed., 1988) (discussing strict scrutiny as 
applied to freedom of association, rights of privacy and personhood, and as a tier of equal 
protection review). 
 132. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (noting that the Court had previously 
held the Communications Decency Act (CDA) unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844 (1997), “because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest and because less restrictive alternatives were available”). 
 133. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871 (questioning whether CDA had been “carefully tailored to the 
congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials”). 
 134. The rhetoric of several equal-protection cases dovetails with this conclusion. See, 
e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725–26 (1982) (reasoning that the 
purpose of heightened scrutiny is to foster “reasoned analysis”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199, 214 (1977) (invalidating a law that discriminated on the basis of sex when 
“nothing . . . suggest[ed] a reasoned congressional judgment” was made). 
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vantage point, rules that focus on things like legislative thoroughness, 
legislative purpose, and recent legislative reexaminations make good sense. 
A critic of semisubstantive rules might question this logic by pointing to 
important features of the constitutional text.  The objector could note that 
the Framers endorsed specialized decision-making processes for only 
certain purposes—for example, by requiring a two-thirds Senate vote to 
convict in an impeachment proceeding or to bring a treaty into effect.135  
For the skeptic, these provisions create room for a negative-implication 
argument against semisubstantive rules.  After all, if the Constitution’s text 
dictates the use of specialized decision-making structures in impeachment, 
treaty-ratification, and other distinctive contexts, how can courts demand 
the use of similarly specialized, but unenumerated, decision-making 
structures in other settings?  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius!136 
The expressio unius argument has, at first blush, an enticing quality.  On 
close inspection, however, it tells us precious little about semisubstantive 
judicial review.  To begin with, the Constitution’s specialized process 
terms—such as its two-thirds voting requirements—concern the operation 
of only the national government; thus, even if the argument has merit, it 
provides no obstacle to identifying semisubstantive rules that apply to the 
states.  Even more important, the expressio unius rule does not carry water 
with regard to the national government itself.  To be sure, that principle 
would present a problem if, for example, the Court tried to say that all 
exercises of the commerce power must receive a two-thirds Senate vote to 
safeguard federalism values.  The semisubstantive rules the Court has 
wielded in the past, however, are a distant cry from this sort of jarringly 
odd, strictly numerical, and obviously countertextual would-be 
constitutional doctrine. 
The Court, for example, has suggested that the presence of legislative 
studies may prove decisive in cases that present commerce-power-based 
regulation of highly localized, noncommercial activities.137  Such a rule of 
basic attentiveness is far removed from any hypothetical two-thirds Senate 
vote requirement.  Indeed, when Congress makes no effort to tie ostensibly 
noncommercial, regulatory programs to the vitality of interstate commerce, 
there is reason to say that this manner of proceeding violates basic dictates 
of constitutional structure.  As the lower court observed in Lopez, 
 
 135. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (impeachment); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaties); see 
also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 380 (suggesting that the Speech or Debate Clause 
may “preclude judicial supervision of congressional proceedings”); Buzbee & Schapiro, 
supra note 11, at 151 (“Nothing in the Constitution dictates the sources of information that 
legislators may consider in drafting and voting on legislation.”); Frickey & Smith, supra 
note 11, at 1744 (noting that “[t]he Constitution does not . . . specify any process” for 
legislative decision making). 
 136. “[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 
793 n.9 (1995) (discussing interaction of the expressio unius principle and the Qualifications 
Clause). 
 137. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
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Courts cannot properly perform their duty to determine if there is any 
rational basis for a Congressional finding [of a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce] if neither the legislative history nor the statute itself 
reveals any such relevant finding.  And, in such a situation there is 
nothing to indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed, as opposed to 
simply disregarded, the boundary line between the commerce power and 
the reserved power of the states.138 
The expressio unius argument is even more strained in its application to 
semisubstantive rules derived from the Bill of Rights.  The whole point of 
the constitutional amendments, after all, is to alter the effect of the original 
Constitution.  It follows that semisubstantive rules fairly derived from the 
Bill of Rights—such as the findings-and-study rule of Reno v. ACLU139—
necessarily supersede whatever inferences one might otherwise draw from 
Articles I through VI.  At the least, the trumping effect of the amendments 
should not give way to attenuated inferences drawn from sources as far 
removed in subject matter as the Treaty and Impeachment Clauses.140 
 
 138. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363–64 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995); see also David S. Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark:  An Inquiry into the Limits of 
Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187, 198 
(1972) (anticipating and arguing for such a findings requirement “where the relationship of 
the law to interstate commerce is not readily apparent,” and reasoning that this requirement 
“could assist in focusing Congressional concern on the proper issues”).  Indeed, the text of 
the U.S. Constitution itself provides some basis for reaching the same conclusion.  The law 
in Lopez, and others like it, after all, can be constitutional only if they are “necessary and 
proper for carrying into [e]xecution” the commerce power.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  It 
is not self-evident that a law—and particularly a law that bears no plain relation to 
commerce—constitutes a “proper” exercise of the commerce power when Congress itself 
has not identified the connection to commerce on which its assertion of authority purportedly 
rests. 
 139. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (discussed supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text). 
 140. Another text-based critique of subjecting Congress to semisubstantive rules directed 
at federal lawmakers (or at least to some of these rules) stems from the Constitution’s 
injunction that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 5, cl. 2.  As Professors Christopher Bryant and Timothy Simeone have written, “[t]he 
Supreme Court has long read the Rules and Journal Clauses as providing Congress broad 
discretion to determine how to report and record its consideration of proposed legislation.” 
Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 376; see also Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 417 (noting, 
but rejecting, this argument); cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional 
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366 (2004) (describing the Rules of Proceedings Clause 
as “in effect, a delegation of rule-designing authority from constitutional framers in the 
initial period to legislators in subsequent periods”).  The answer to this suggestion is that 
Congress’s rulemaking powers, like all of its powers, are limited by the Bill of Rights and 
other applicable constitutional inhibitions.  What if, for example, the House issued a “rule” 
for its “proceedings” that barred speeches from the floor except when made by white, 
protestant males in support of policies favored by the President?  This rule would be invalid 
because it offends constitutional inhibitions on government conduct that trump the rule-
making power.  By symmetry of logic, if there are constitutional inhibitions that, in specified 
areas, mandate semisubstantive doctrines, then those inhibitions must limit the rulemaking 
power as well.  Just as surely as the “plenary” commerce power, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824), is hemmed in by constitutional limitations derived from outside 
Article I, Section 8, so too the congressional rulemaking power is hemmed in by 
constitutional limits that spring from sources outside Article I, Section 5. 
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B.  Argument 2 (Counteroriginalist Nature):  Semisubstantive Decision 
Making Contravenes an “Originalist” Interpretive Approach 
Is judicial recognition of semisubstantive rules consistent with the 
specialized interpretive philosophy known as “originalism”?  The proper 
meaning of this term, and its rightful role in constitutional discourse, are 
subjects well beyond the scope of this Article.  There is reason to believe, 
however, that many self-styled originalists might embrace some—if not 
many—semisubstantive rules. 
In The Federalist No. 81, for example, Alexander Hamilton asserted that 
the Constitution should operate as “the standard of construction for the 
laws”141 so as to guard against the operation of “unjust and partial” 
enactments.142  These passages give support to constitutionally inspired 
clear-statement rules of statutory interpretation.  Early decision making by 
the Supreme Court reflects this same process-sensitive approach.143  
Sources from the founding period thus seem to endorse one prominent form 
of semisubstantive constitutional decision making. 
The Federalist does not speak of such phenomena as findings-based 
review or constitutional “who” rules.  It does, however, repeatedly 
emphasize the centrality of the values that give rise to these doctrines.  For 
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, a properly functioning republic did not require 
“an unqualified compliasance to every sudden breese of passion, or to every 
transient impulse” of popular majorities.144  To the contrary, “the 
republican principle” embraced by the Framers “demands[] that the 
deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct” of 
government.145  For this reason, elected representatives were to give 
legislative proposals “cool and sedate reflection” so that “temporary 
delusion”146 and “momentary inclination”147—including those resulting 
from “cabals of the representative body”148—would not find their way into 
binding enactments.  Of particular importance, the judiciary had a key role 
to play in “guard[ing] the constitution and the rights of individuals from . . . 
ill humours . . . [of] the people themselves . . . which, though they speedily 
give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a 
tendency in the mean time to occasion dangerous innovations in the 
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party.”149  The 
overarching message of these materials is loud and clear: 
 
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 543 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 528. 
 143. See infra notes 152–54, 191, 333 and accompanying text. 
 144. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 482.  The words 
“passion” and “passions” appear in The Federalist sixty-six times and never in a 
complimentary light. THE FEDERALIST CONCORDANCE 390–91 (Thomas S. Engeman et al. 
eds., 1988). 
 145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 482 . 
 146. Id. at 482–83. 
 147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 527. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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The oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the 
diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be 
the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of 
those mis[s]teps which proceed from the contagion of some common 
passion or interest.150 
Some originalists might find little support for semisubstantive rules in 
passages of this ilk.  Their point would be that, while deliberation-
enhancement was an aim of the Framers, there is no evidence that they 
intended to promote this goal with semisubstantive judicial interventions.  
This line of reasoning, however, may give too little weight to the original 
understanding that courts would extrapolate rules from underlying 
constitutional premises.151  In its seminal decision in McCulloch v. 
Maryland,152 for example, the Court concluded that a state could not tax the 
National Bank by relying on values of national autonomy “interwoven with 
[the] web” of the Constitution.153  Notably, if Congress had clearly 
authorized state taxation of federal banks in the wake of McCulloch, there 
can be little doubt that the Court would have upheld this act of federal self-
abnegation.  McCulloch itself thus exemplifies semisubstantive decision 
making in the form of a constitutionally inspired “common-law-like” 
rule.154 
There is another reason to question easy assumptions that 
semisubstantive decision making runs afoul of an originalist outlook.  As 
Professor Sunstein has observed, “The Constitution doesn’t set out a theory 
of interpretation; it doesn’t announce that judges must follow the original 
 
 150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 495.  Some 
commentators have reflected on these passages in ways that lend support to semisubstantive 
rules.  In particular, such rules might well insulate legislators “from popular reaction for a 
period of time sufficient to change public opinion for the better without denying the public’s 
ultimate right to judge.” Sotirios A. Barber, Judicial Review and The Federalist, 55 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 836, 845 (1988); see also Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless 
Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059, 1069 (1974) (describing the Court’s role as largely one of 
“produc[ing] an intermediate stop which would allow an opportunity for reason and justice 
to reassert themselves,” and quoting Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. to describe judicial 
review as a “‘device to appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober’” (quoting Charles E. 
Wyzanski, Jr., Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REV. 389, 393 (1944))).  A classic treatment of the 
centrality of “deliberative democracy,” including its roots in the Framers’ thinking, is CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). See id. at 21–23 (discussing connection of 
this outlook to The Federalist). For an earlier effort of mine to develop linkages between 
semisubstantive decision making and “the discernible purposes and aspirations of the 
Founders themselves,” see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1867–69. 
 151. For an early example of this style of extrapolation-based decision making, see Ex 
parte Craig, 6 F. Cas. 710, 710–11 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 3321) (Washington, Circuit J.) 
(rejecting governmental power to seize money from accused counterfeiter because of risk 
that resulting lack of funds would interfere with the accused’s ability to exercise Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel and to secure witnesses). 
 152. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 153. Id. at 426. 
 154. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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understanding.”155 This point raises a profound question:  where does 
originalism itself come from?  The answer to this question is complicated, 
but one element of that answer seems clear:  defenders of the originalist 
methodology argue that it best comports with a proper focus on majoritarian 
decision making in a self-governing republic.  As Robert Bork has 
articulated the point, a “philosophy of originalism” is defensible because it 
provides “the only approach that can make judicial review democratically 
legitimate.”156  In other words, nonoriginalist styles of interpretation are 
properly rejected because they effectively permit unelected judges to wield 
nondemocratic judgment in whatever field they choose to occupy. 
If the value of preserving democratic self-government is a proper 
touchstone for evaluating styles of judicial review—as Judge Bork’s 
defense of originalism seems to suggest—the case for semisubstantive 
review may gain substantial force.  The entire thrust of semisubstantive 
doctrines, after all, is to leave final decision-making authority in the hands 
of Congress and other democratically accountable institutions.157  To be 
sure, these rules call on political decision makers to exercise heightened 
levels of care when they enter constitutional danger zones.  But the essential 
role of the doctrines is to refine and focus, rather than to frustrate and 
defeat, democratic decision making.158 
 
 155. Cass R. Sunstein, Fighting for the Supreme Court:  How Right-Wing Judges Are 
Transforming the Constitution, HARPER’S MAG., Sept. 1, 2005, at 31, 36.  Professor Sunstein 
might add that if originalism itself is not reflected in the Constitution’s text, then it has 
legitimacy only if it can be properly extrapolated from extratextual premises and values.  But 
if originalism is properly extrapolated from extratextual premises and values, then why not 
semisubstantive doctrines?  In particular, why should courts not find merit in such doctrines 
given the deep original commitment to deliberative republican decision making that these 
doctrines seek to foster? See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
 156. Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Miers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A12. 
 157. See infra notes 326–28 and accompanying text. 
 158. In any event, even if use of semisubstantive rules somehow threatens the value of 
democratic self-government, it certainly does so no more than the many hard-and-fast rules 
of constitutional law triggered by the originalist method.  This is all the more true because 
even leading originalists acknowledge that their methodology will not provide clear answers 
in many cases because judges must inevitably extract from historical materials “the 
principles the ratifiers understood themselves” and then “apply those principles to 
unforeseen circumstances.” Bork, supra note 156.  One difficulty is that constitutional 
“principles” can be identified at many levels of generality.  Critics of originalism say, for 
example, that originalists must reject the Court’s canonical decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education because the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had no intention to end school 
segregation. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 64.  Some originalists respond by saying that 
those ratifiers simultaneously embraced the broader goal of achieving racial equality and that 
this more general goal should not be defeated by embracing a subprinciple that permits 
school segregation. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 81–82 (1990).  This response, of course, illustrates the need for the 
exercise of judicial judgment in defining constitutional principles and in determining how 
clashing principles are to be reconciled.  No less important, applying originalist principles to 
unforeseen conditions is in its nature a judgment-laden business.  (If, for example, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in keeping with its text, embodies a principle of equality that 
extends beyond race discrimination, might it not be that that principle should outlaw 
government discrimination based on sexual orientation if “unforeseen conditions” suggest 
that sexual orientation, like race, is genetically determined?)  In short, originalist decision 
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The bottom line is that, if one genuinely seeks a constitutional 
methodology that celebrates democratic decision making, it is hard to see 
why the semisubstantive approach does not fill the bill.159  In short, the 
semisubstantive technique, with its emphasis on facilitating majoritarian 
involvement in the reification of constitutional values, may be seen as 
fundamentally compatible with the same goal of democratic self-
governance that underlies in large measure the “originalist” stance. 
C.  Argument 3 (Unprincipledness):  Semisubstantive Rules Are Ill-Advised 
Because They Are Not Cabined by Principle and Thus Are Subject to 
Judicial Abuse 
In his opinion in Thompson, Justice Scalia suggested that Justice 
O’Connor’s approach to that case, and by implication other semisubstantive 
approaches as well, are inherently unprincipled.160  This sort of argument, 
 
making permits judges to displace many programs implemented by democratically chosen 
decision makers through the exercise of judicial translation. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that government use of modern heat-sensing to gather 
information within a home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).  For 
this reason, the originalist methodology carries its own threat of judicial innovation and 
countermajoritarian results.  And because originalist rulings are often hard-and-fast, the 
innovations and results that originalism triggers may well have more antidemocratic effects 
than outcomes produced by semisubstantive rules. 
 159. As Professor Burt Neuborne has observed, 
  While critics of process-based review have correctly noted that the judiciary, in 
identifying the required process, makes covert value judgments only slightly less 
profound than those more openly expressed by substantive-review courts, genuine 
process-based judicial review nonetheless poses a lesser challenge to democratic 
political theory.  To the extent that process-based review requires normative 
judgments, they are prior judgments about who should make a choice and how it 
should be made, rather than the ad hoc substitution of a judge’s substantive 
choices for those of the majority.  Additionally, in many—perhaps most—settings, 
the impact of process-based review will be merely to remand an issue to one or 
another democratic forum for reconsideration in a procedurally correct manner.  
As such, it casts a suspensive veto that slows, but does not derail, majority will. 
Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 366 (1982); see also Calabresi, supra note 21, at 136 (“Requiring a 
second look would not . . . amount to imposing the judge’s elite moral values on the polity 
. . . .  In reality the only values imposed are constitutionally grounded ones that . . . require 
the legislature to speak openly and thoughtfully when rights are at stake.”); Harry H. 
Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 505 (1982) (“Far from 
foreclosing legislative choices, therefore, these doctrines shape the process by which 
legislative goals may be achieved.”). 
 160. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 874–78 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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long a feature of constitutional discourse,161 centers on the indeterminacy of 
legal doctrine162 and resulting opportunities for judicial excess.163 
With good reason, rule-of-law concerns sometimes steer courts away 
from pliable doctrines in favor of “bright line” rules.164  There is, however, 
a countertendency in our law.  In the service of substantive constitutional 
values, courts often embrace doctrines that engender uncertainty and require 
elaboration in later rulings.165  Our greatest jurists have recognized the need 
for courts to apply rules driven by “considerations of degree.”166  No less 
important, the Framers themselves emphasized the inevitability that 
constitutional doctrine would take shape over time as courts built judicial 
precedent upon judicial precedent in keeping with the common-law 
tradition.167  In short, any “unprincipledness” attack leveled against 
semisubstantive rules turns on a principle of principledness that itself is 
marked by significant indeterminacy. 
Beyond this, critics may be gazing from the wrong vantage point if they 
seek to find one clear principle that unifies all of the Court’s 
semisubstantive jurisprudence.  After years of looking, most of us would 
say that there is no grand theory of constitutional law.168  And if there is no 
 
 161. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 521 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws 
unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of 
power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the courts and 
worse for the country.”). 
 162. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the “legislative process requirement” in the Commerce Clause context that 
“would function . . . under standards never expressed and more or less arbitrarily applied”). 
 163. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling Justice O’Connor’s 
approach a “Solomonic solution” but emphasizing that “Solomon . . . was not subject to the 
constitutional constraints of the judicial department of a national government in a federal, 
democratic system”); see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 392 (noting that certain 
semisubstantive approaches do not offer “judicially manageable standards” and offer 
“maximum flexibility for the Supreme Court . . . [that] would clearly be subject to judicial 
abuse”). 
 164. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan J., dissenting) 
(claiming the majority is “formulating an arbitrary ‘bright-line’ rule” to deal with automobile 
searches); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“[T]he Warrant Clause places 
the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion 
of police authority.”). 
 165. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–76 (2002) (rejecting court of 
appeals’ attempts to “‘clearly delimit’” officers’ consideration of factors in investigatory 
stop in favor of admittedly “abstract” totality-of-circumstances test (quoting United States v. 
Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
 166. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) 
(Cardozo, J., concurring). 
 167. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 529 
(describing the “considerable bulk” of judicial precedent that will have to be developed); see 
also David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 
YALE L.J. 1717, 1729 (2003) (asserting that “[t]o a large extent our constitutional law has . . . 
becom[e] a common law system in which cases are decided on the basis of precedents”). 
 168. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. 
REV. 1331, 1332 (1988) (“Constitutional law needs no grand theoretical foundation.  None is 
likely ever to be forthcoming, and none is desirable.”); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in 
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grand theory of constitutional law, there probably can be no grand theory of 
semisubstantive constitutional law either.  Why should there be?  To date, 
different semisubstantive rules have emerged in different areas of law to 
address different needs.  Federalism-driven clear-statement rules,169 for 
example, compensate for the Court’s nearly unwavering unwillingness to 
declare that acts of Congress reach beyond the commerce power.170  So-
called “Carolene groups” clear-statement rules respond to the Framers’ 
concerns about factional oppression of vulnerable minorities.171  And the 
“why” rule of Hunter reflects the fundamental Fourteenth Amendment goal 
of stemming state-sponsored oppression of racial minorities.172 
To be sure, a skeptic might cite this clutter of rules as reflecting the very 
problem Justice Scalia touched on in Thompson—namely, that 
semisubstantive safeguards can become a “loose cannon” in the hands of 
judges too ready to aim and fire.173  There are two parts to this worry—first, 
that courts might profligately erect semisubstantive rules all over the 
constitutional map,174 and second, that courts might apply any particular 
semisubstantive rule in an unpredictable, overreaching way.175  In 
Thompson itself, for example, Justice Scalia voiced concern that courts 
might, on Justice O’Connor’s rationale, countenance imposition of the 
death penalty only if it were mandated by public referenda, two-thirds 
majority legislative votes, or the enactment of “bills printed in 10-point 
type.”176 
These concerns, though understandable, do not undermine 
semisubstantive decision making.  As to the worry about judicial 
 
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1766 (1994) (“What theory could 
possibly provide a persuasive and coherent rationale for the entire body of American 
constitutional law as well as provide persuasive guidance for all future cases?”); Paul E. 
McGreal, Ambition’s Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2000) (“Indeed, a 
rejection of grand constitutional theory can be inferred from aspects of the Constitution’s 
structure and history.”). 
 169. See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text (discussing Solid Waste Agency v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)). 
 170. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1991). See generally Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (asserting that primary check on 
Commerce Clause power should and does lie in the operation of the national political 
process). 
 171. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., supra note 33, at 352–55 (discussing interpretive 
canons favoring Native Americans). 
 172. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (discussing Hunter v. Underwood, 
471 U.S. 222 (1985)). 
 173. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 174. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 105 n.71 (describing criticism of Professor Bickel 
for advocating a judicial role that would too often allow judges to use legislative remands). 
 175. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 392 (stating semisubstantive rules “would 
clearly be subject to judicial abuse”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 143 (attacking 
semisubstantive rules as a “mode of review that defies predictability, provides minimal 
guidance to future courts and litigants, and . . . places judges in the position of second-
guessing judgments of the political branches”); Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1723–26 
(expressing concern about inability of Congress to anticipate the highly exacting findings-
based rule of Garrett). 
 176. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 875–76. 
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profligacy, it is no criticism to say that the Court has erected many 
semisubstantive rules if those rules advance constitutional values in a 
legitimate way.  That structural rules often perform such work is suggested 
by the fact that the adoption and application of such rules often stir little or 
no opposition.  Hunter was the product of a unanimous Court.177  So was 
Reno v. ACLU178 and the relevant section of the Court’s dial-a-porn 
decision in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC.179  That the rules of these 
cases are simultaneously semisubstantive and uncontroversial suggests that 
abandoning them—and especially abandoning them wholesale—might well 
do more harm than good. 
As to concerns about the overreaching character of particular 
semisubstantive doctrines, claimed reasons for castigation seem even more 
strained.  Justice Scalia’s handwringing about the risk of typeface-size and 
supermajority-voting rules, for example, misses a key point.  Not one of the 
semisubstantive doctrines that the Court actually has recognized imposes 
any numerically driven procedural requirement of this sort.180  No less 
important, to those of us who are looking, such a requirement does not loom 
on the constitutional horizon.  Justice Scalia might respond that this 
historical pattern is inconsequential.  Rather, to borrow from Hamlet, the 
principle is the thing,181 and the problem is that there is no way to forge a 
workable doctrine that logically distinguishes permissible from 
impermissible semisubstantive interventions. 
This criticism is itself subject to criticism on the ground that the level of 
predictability it demands is lacking in many fields of constitutional law.182  
Put another way, if courts are willing to use open-textured approaches in 
nonsemisubstantive decision making, it is hard to see why a similar play in 
the joints is intolerable when courts use semisubstantive rules.  In United 
States v. Lopez,183 for example, the Court found that Congress had 
overreached its commerce power by regulating a “noncommercial” subject, 
 
 177. Hunter, 471 U.S. 222; see also supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
 178. 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 179. 492 U.S. 115 (1989); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.  Notably, 
Justice Scalia wrote separately in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC to emphasize that 
“[n]either due process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by 
committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote.” 492 U.S. at 133 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  No other member of the Court signed on to this disclaimer. 
 180. See Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 381 (conceding that “it would be foolish for a court 
to tell Congress that it must always hold at least one hour of floor debate for every proposal 
under consideration”). 
 181. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 2, sc. 2 (“[T]he 
play’s the thing.”). 
 182. Of course, Justice Scalia has been known to lament the lack of predictability in 
various areas of constitutional law. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (collecting opinions 
criticizing the Lemon test).  In general, however, his pleas have not carried the day. See, e.g., 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that 
the Court was improvising “constitutional structure on the basis of currently perceived 
utility”). 
 183. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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notwithstanding four dissenters’ insistence that this governing principle was 
too opaque.184  The majority, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, 
responded that, 
 Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is 
commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal 
uncertainty.  But, so long as Congress’ authority is limited to those 
powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated 
powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, 
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will 
engender “legal uncertainty.” . . . The Constitution mandates this 
uncertainty . . . .185 
Indeterminacy, in short, is rampant in constitutional law.  Given this reality, 
it hardly seems right to single out semisubstantive rules for critique on 
indeterminacy grounds. 
In any event, the field of semisubstantive rules is not devoid of limiting 
principles—and this is true whether one looks at those rules in joint or 
several fashion.  In many semisubstantive decisions, the Court has worked 
hard to identify confining elements of decision.  In Gregory v. Ashcroft,186 
for example, the Court deemed the Federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act inapplicable to state judges by applying a semisubstantive 
federalism-driven super-clear-statement rule of statutory interpretation; in 
doing so, however, the Court took pains to link that rule to those state 
“political functions” already made the subject of special judicial deference 
in preexisting alienage-discrimination rulings.187  In Mow Sun Wong188 the 
Court again drew on this “political functions” principle—normally of 
significance in evaluating state alienage-based discrimination—in applying 
a constitutional “who” rule to a federal ban on hiring noncitizens.189  One 
might decry the “political functions” principle applied in these cases as 
unduly loosey-goosey.  Such an attack, however, does not target 
semisubstantive rules; instead it takes aim at a principle developed long ago 
as the Court forged constitutional doctrine to deal with alienage-based 
discrimination.190  To say that semisubstantive rules are unprincipled 
because preexisting doctrinal categories are unprincipled is to offer no 
criticism properly directed at semisubstantive rules themselves. 
 
 184. Id. at 551; id. at 627–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 566 (majority opinion). 
 186. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 187. Id. at 461–63 (“This plain statement rule is . . . an acknowledgement that the States 
retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme. . . . These [alienage-
discrimination] cases stand in recognition of the authority . . . of the States to determine 
qualifications of their most important government officials.”). 
 188. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 189. Id. at 102–03 & 102 n.22. 
 190. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73–74 (1979) (permitting exclusion of aliens 
from position of public school teacher on political function grounds); Foley v. Connelie, 435 
U.S. 291, 298–99 (1978) (permitting exclusion of aliens from state police force under this 
same principle). 
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Other limiting principles operate in this field.  One is that legislative 
ambiguity properly justifies the use of constitutionally driven clear-
statement rules, just as surely as it brings into play any number of other 
rules of statutory interpretation.191  In recent years, leading scholars have 
shown that many rules of statutory construction advance “public values.”192  
Against this backdrop, it seems entirely sensible that the Court has forged 
interpretive rules distinctively responsive to those public values that are 
constitutional in character. 
Apart from clear-statement rules, the Court has brought semisubstantive 
analysis to bear primarily in cases that involve fundamental rights or 
suspect classifications.193  A quick protest might be lodged that these terms 
are so amorphous that they do not supply a meaningful constraint.  These 
terms, however, have preexisting meanings in our law, even if those 
meanings may be shadowy at the edges.194  Again, the key point is that any 
challenge to a fundamental-rights/suspect-classification limit on 
semisubstantive rules is not an attack on semisubstantive rules themselves; 
instead, it is an attack on doctrinal concepts long recognized outside the 
semisubstantive-safeguards realm.195 
What is more, the Court has signaled that this fundamental-
rights/suspect-classification limitation does have a confining effect.  In 
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,196 the Court refused to 
endorse a strong semisubstantive challenge directed at a fluky federal 
statute that resulted from congressional misunderstandings triggered by 
self-serving interest group misrepresentations.197  The Court took a hands-
off approach to the case, even in the face of severe process problems, 
because the challenge was mounted under only the minimal-scrutiny prong 
of equal-protection analysis.198  In other words, the Court forewent a 
semisubstantive invalidation—despite powerful pleas for a process-
 
 191. See, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384–85 (2003) (discussing and applying noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9 (1995) 
(discussing maxim of expressio unius); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 
564–65 (1845) (stating rule of in pari materia and explaining its use where legislative 
language is unclear). 
 192. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) (exploring the role public values play in statutory 
interpretation); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 921 n.1 (1992) (collecting literature); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (proposing a set of 
interpretive norms designed to promote goals of deliberative government). 
 193. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text. 
 194. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (describing 
intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications). 
 195. See supra notes 124–34 and accompanying text. 
 196. 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
 197. See id. at 189–93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (positing that challenged legislation was, 
among other things, supported by misstatements that were “frequent and unrebutted”). 
 198. Id. at 175 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Court in cases involving social and economic 
benefits has consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds legislation which 
it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn.”). 
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remedying intervention—because no “fundamental constitutional right” or 
“suspect” classification was in view.199 
The Court not only has developed principles that limit the settings in 
which semisubstantive rules operate; it also has suggested principles that 
restrict the permissible nature of procedural requirements imposed by these 
doctrines.  To return to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Thompson, all of the 
semisubstantive safeguards the Court has recognized to date are far 
removed from the imposition of a two-thirds-vote requirement (an approach 
that would undermine, rather than reinforce, the basic principle of majority 
rule); a popular-referendum requirement (an approach that would engender 
both disruptive delay and heightened cost in violation of the Madisonian 
emphasis on representative government);200 or a ten-point-type requirement 
for proposed bills (an approach that smacks of hypertechnicality and 
inattention to actual levels of legislative care).  In essence, the 
semisubstantive rules actually fashioned by the Court focus on forcing 
policymakers to use decision-making procedures (like preenactment study, 
sunset-like requirements, or budgeted spending) (1) that policymakers 
frequently utilize anyway, (2) that are widely recognized as playing a 
valuable deliberation-enhancing role, and (3) that operate within the 
overarching context of representative and majoritarian decision making.  In 
addition, the Court has required special procedures, primarily (if not only) 
in instances where they operate to serve a particular constitutional end in a 
plainly logical way.201 
Finally, semisubstantive invalidations do not tie the policymaker’s hands 
forever, or even for a single day.  Rather, these doctrines in their nature 
invite an override by the political branches of what is, by definition, only a 
provisional judicial ruling.202  Those who attack semisubstantive rules as 
unprincipled must recognize and respond to their self-limiting character.  
The key point is clear:  constitutional doctrines that give political 
officials—rather than judicial officials—the last word on how to resolve 
hotly contested constitutional questions seem distinctly undeserving of 
labels such as unconstrained, uncontrollable, and overreaching.203 
 
 199. Id. at 174–75. 
 200. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 141, at 62–65. 
 201. See, e.g., supra notes 39–42, 141–42, 169–70, 186–87 and accompanying text 
(discussing clear-statement rule designed to protect federalism values that otherwise might 
receive too little judicial protection). 
 202. See, e.g., supra notes 97, 115 and accompanying text (describing reactions to 
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972)). 
 203. See, e.g., Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the 
Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CANADIAN B. REV. 481, 532 (2001) 
(suggesting that a “dialogic approach” to constitutional decision making “diminishes perhaps 
to the point of evaporation” the tension between democracy and judicial review).  Indeed, 
there is much to be said for just the opposite idea—namely, that semisubstantive rules serve 
a critical purpose by summoning political decision makers, and the people themselves, to 
participate actively in the elaboration of constitutional restraints. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & 
LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 229 (2004) (arguing against judicial 
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D.  Argument 4 (Intrusiveness):  Semisubstantive Rules—As Both a 
Practical and an Historical Matter—Are Unduly Invasive and Disdainful of 
Legislative Autonomy Because They Interfere Directly with Legislative 
Processes 
Justice Scalia attacked Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Thompson not only 
because he saw it as inviting an unpredictable variety of judicial 
interventions, but also because he feared it would promote judicial 
“interference in the States’ legislative processes, the heart of their 
sovereignty.”204  The Oklahoma legislature, he reasoned, “must in the 
future legislate in the manner that we say.”205  In his view, this process-
centered approach was “more disdainful” of “States’ rights” than even the 
hard-and-fast substantive-result-centered approach of the Thompson 
plurality.206  Others have voiced similar concerns.207  In his dissent in the 
Lopez case,208 for example, Justice Souter wrote that “review [of 
congressional enactments] for deliberateness would be as patently 
unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this 
Court.”209 
There is something to these concerns.  As early as 1810, in Fletcher v. 
Peck,210 the Supreme Court declared that “the invalidity of a law cannot be 
questioned because undue influence may have been used in obtaining it.”211  
 
monopoly in constitutional interpretation on the ground that, under such a system, the people 
will not accept the authority of the Constitution or of judicial interpretations of it); id. at 
237–38 (emphasizing value of colloquies with regard to constitutional meaning); Daniel A. 
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 926 
(1987) (“‘[D]ue process of lawmaking’ has the potential to strengthen the democratic 
process.”). 
 204. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 848 (4th 
Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“[A] judicial 
mandate that Congress construct a proper paper trail . . . [would] ill befit the dignity of the 
Legislature.”); Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 382 (noting that the “Court has held that 
judicial intrusion into congressional procedures is inconsistent with the constitutional 
commitment to legislative independence” even when faced with credible evidence of 
legislative abuse); see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 142 (arguing that new 
legislative record rules will create “combative relationship between Congress and the 
States”); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common 
Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1153 (1978) (“[T]he constitutional common law might well 
precipitate a clash of will between Congress and the Court.  Far from reducing friction, the 
proposal seems calculated to increase it.”). 
 208. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 209. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also 
Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 370 (identifying “significant separation-of-powers concerns, as 
well as practical concerns about the consequences of subjecting the flexible lawmaking 
process to the rigid judicial process”). 
 210. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 211. Id. at 123. See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 194 (1998) (“[I]f a 
statute appears on its face to be constitutional and valid, courts will not inquire into the 
motives of the legislature, or influence brought to bear to secure enactment of a statute.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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Building on this notion, American courts generally have eschewed the 
invalidation of legislative actions on the process-based grounds that they 
resulted from “fraud, bribery and corruption.”212  In a like vein, following 
the lead of Field v. Clark,213 many courts have shied away from policing 
legislative adherence to internal procedures through use of the so-called 
“enrolled-bill rule.”214  The thrust of these doctrines is to immunize statutes 
from invalidation on the ground that they spring from tainted legislative 
processes.  Arguing by analogy, Justice Scalia and analysts like him might 
well assert that semisubstantive doctrines violate a strong tradition of 
judicial noninterference in the internal operations of political decision 
makers. 
Advocates of this position, however, must confront a difficulty that 
Justice Scalia himself has highlighted in other settings—namely, the 
difficulty of identifying the proper level of generality at which to describe 
the relevant tradition.  In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,215 Justice Scalia staked 
the claim that, at least in some contexts, traditions are best characterized at 
their greatest level of specificity.216  Building on this thinking, the tradition 
reflected in the fraud-and-bribery principle and the enrolled-bill rule does 
not extend to semisubstantive doctrines for at least two reasons.  First, 
semisubstantive doctrines—in contrast to the rules of Fletcher and Field—
focus on vindicating particular text-based substantive constitutional 
guaranties.217  Second, semisubstantive rules seek to vindicate these 
guarantees in ways distinctively responsive to the particular constitutional 
values at stake.218  For these reasons, semisubstantive rules do not involve a 
 
 212. Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. 121, 293 (1881). 
 213. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 214. The enrolled-bill rule, 
provides that an act ratified by the presiding officers of the legislature, approved 
by the [executive], and enrolled in the proper . . . office is conclusively presumed 
to have been properly passed, and such an act is not subject to impeachment by 
evidence outside the act as enrolled to show it was not passed in compliance with 
law. 
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 44 (2001); see Field, 143 U.S. at 668–73 (holding that even if an 
enrolled bill omits portions of legislation actually passed by both houses of Congress, 
signature by the President and leaders of both houses renders the statute unimpeachable); 
Williams v. MacFeeley, 197 S.E. 225, 228–29 (Ga. 1938) (applying rule); Commonwealth v. 
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 172 (Ky. 1914) (same).  Some jurisdictions follow a less 
restrictive but still deferential approach known as the “journal entry rule.”  Under this view 
the enrolled bill acts as prima facie evidence of the regular enactment, but the courts are 
permitted to have recourse to the legislative journals in order to ascertain whether the law 
has been passed in accordance with constitutional requirements. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 
43 (2001); see also, e.g., Amos v. Moseley, 77 So. 619, 621 (Fla. 1917) (applying rule). 
 215. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 216. Id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). 
 217. In contrast, more general procedural requirements apply to all legislation. See United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892) (refusing to look behind legislative journals to 
determine whether speaker had properly counted quorum as reflected in journals); Field v. 
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892) (rejecting, on enrolled-bill principles, argument that statute 
that omitted a section actually passed by both houses of Congress did not become law by the 
President’s signature). 
 218. See supra notes 32–116, 123 and accompanying text. 
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license for courts to police the honesty, integrity, and professionalism of 
legislatures in a free-form, across-the-board way.219  The principles of 
Fletcher and Field thus bear in only the most generalized manner on the 
normative claims of semisubstantive constitutional rules. 
In addition, while the fraud-or-bribery and enrolled-bill-rule decisions 
represent a tradition of judicial noninterference with legislative 
processes,220 there is a deep-rooted countertradition in our law.  The case 
for motive-based analysis, for example, reaches as far back as McCulloch v. 
Maryland.221  So too with “constitutional . . . common-law-like rules”222 
that find expression not only in McCulloch223 but in well-aged dormant 
Commerce Clause decisions as well.224  Clear statement rules were invoked 
during the era of Chief Justice Marshall,225 and constitutional sunset 
doctrines surfaced as early as the 1930s.226  More fundamentally, the entire 
theory of representation-reinforcement review, which has long pervaded our 
constitutional discourse, focuses on “the process by which the laws that 
govern society are made.”227  And, both the Supreme Court and other courts 
have found constitutional violations based on the process, rather than the 
content, of legislative action on many occasions.228 
 
 219. See Brest, supra note 79, at 101 (“In Fletcher the question that the Court refused to 
ask was:  what did the decisionmakers desire to achieve in terms of personal benefits (for 
example, lining their pockets) by the act of voting?  The inquiry [in “why” rule cases] bears 
closer resemblance to the traditional search for legislative purpose as an aid to statutory 
interpretation:  what effects did the decisionmakers desire to achieve by the operation of 
their decision?  These inquiries differ functionally as well as formally, for the methods for 
proving corruption entail a judicial intrusion into the political processes that is largely absent 
in the latter inquiry.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 376–78 (pointing to Field as evidence 
that the Court has traditionally stayed clear of intruding into Congress’s legislative process). 
 221. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 387 (1819) (suggesting recognition of a judicial duty to 
intervene when Congress invokes an enumerated power as a “pretext” to regulate local 
matters); see also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367–68 (1915) (invalidating facially 
neutral law with regard to literacy tests on the ground that its purpose was to disenfranchise 
African Americans). 
 222. Coenen, supra note 7, at 1735–55; see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 
1974 Term—Foreword:  Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975). 
 223. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 224. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (overturning 
pilotage penalty for foreign vessels). See generally supra notes 16–20. 
 225. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(“[W]here fundamental principles are overthrown . . . the legislative intention must be 
expressed with irresistible clearness . . . .”). 
 226. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1709, 1721–26 (discussing time-tied second-look 
doctrines and constitutional sunset rules, including those discussed in Home Building & 
Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)). 
 227. ELY, supra note 8, at 74. 
 228. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (invalidating one-House 
congressional veto as noncompliant with Article I bicameralism and presentment 
requirements); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189–91 (1978) (refusing to find 
repeal of substantive legislation by subsequent appropriations legislation, and considering 
House and Senate rules declaring out of order any provision of appropriations legislation that 
changes existing law); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (holding that 
Congress used improper procedures to exclude a representative); Gojack v. United States, 
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If the tradition-based attack on semisubstantive rules is subject to serious 
criticism, so too is the companion pragmatic argument that these rules 
intrude in an undue and disrespectful way on legislative autonomy.  
Intrusiveness, of course, is in the eye of the beholder.  To many beholders, 
however, Justice Scalia was surely wrong to say that the structural approach 
taken by Justice O’Connor in Thompson was more invasive with regard to 
legislative integrity than the substantive approach taken by the Court’s 
plurality.229  Under the plurality’s analysis, after all, Oklahoma had no 
choice whatsoever.  It could not—no matter what steps it took—choose to 
execute fifteen-year-old offenders.230  Justice O’Connor, in contrast, gave 
the state an option.  To be sure, it was an unpleasant option from the 
perspective of both the state and Justice Scalia.  But it was an option.231  
After Thompson, Oklahoma did not have to legislate in “the precise form” 
spelled out by Justice O’Connor.232  It did not have to do anything.  But if 
the state wanted to reinstate capital punishment for fifteen-year-olds, Justice 
O’Connor’s approach permitted it to try to do so, while the plurality’s 
approach flatly foreclosed the effort.  In these circumstances, there is every 
reason to say that Justice O’Connor—contrary to Justice Scalia’s 
objection—was following “an approach more respectful of States’ rights 
than the plurality.”233 
 
384 U.S. 702, 706–12 (1966) (finding that subcommittee conducted a legislative 
investigation unauthorized by congressional rules); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 
87–88 (1949) (holding, in prosecution for perjury before House committee, that defendant 
could raise lack of quorum as a defense); see also Linde, supra note 21, at 248 (“The 
Supreme Court holds Congress to its own rules in the case of investigations.”).  State courts 
sometimes intervene on process-centered grounds as well—for example, by enforcing 
constitutional provisions that require laws to deal with only one subject. See, e.g., Dep’t of 
Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 459 (Fla. 1982) (describing state constitutional requirement 
that certain appropriations laws contain provisions on no other subject). See generally Philip 
P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:  Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and 
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 722 n.144 (1996) (“The single-subject 
rule might seem mere formalism, but it could well have the useful effects of forcing the 
legislature to place unrelated issues in separate bills, rather than combine them for logrolling 
purposes.”); Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More than One Subject,” 42 MINN. 
L. REV. 389 (1958) (examining the single-subject rule). 
 229. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion). 
 231. See id. at 857–59 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that this issue should be left to 
the legislature). 
 232. Id. at 876. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 233. Id. at 877; see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“A holding that the classification was not adequately preceded by a 
consideration of less drastic alternatives or adequately explained by a statement of legislative 
purpose would be far less intrusive than a final determination that the substance of the 
decision is not ‘narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.’”); id. at 552 (“[T]here can 
be no separation-of-powers objection to a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality based 
on a failure to follow procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a fundamental 
constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits.”); BICKEL, supra note 8, at 206 (describing 
semisubstantive interventions and other “passive devices . . .  as lesser rational alternatives to 
an otherwise unavoidable principled judgment . . . because they work relatively no binding 
interference with the democratic process”); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. 
REV. 1065, 1109 (1998) (deeming motive-based semisubstantive review “‘intrinsically less 
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More than six decades ago, Professors Alexander M. Bickel and Harry H. 
Wellington made this same point, observing that “[a] candid avowal that a 
matter . . . is being sent back for a second reading, so to speak, is much 
more compatible with due respect for the peculiar powers and competencies 
of both [legislative and judicial] institutions,”234 than an irreversible, hard-
and-fast invalidation of the challenged law.  The key point is that 
semisubstantive decision making has a built-in self-limiting quality.  As we 
have seen, the Court often employs rules that conclusively foreclose results 
that elected policymakers want to reach.235  It seems strange to say that 
these “look never again” rules interfere less with legislative integrity than 
do “look again” rules that specifically invite legislative majorities to 
overturn the judiciary’s action. 
E.  Argument 5 (Manipulability):  Semisubstantive Rules Are Distinctively 
Abusable Because Courts Can Manipulate Them to Achieve Substantive 
Outcomes Without Seeming to Do So 
A fifth argument against semisubstantive rules stems from concerns 
about judicial opportunism.  The fear is that these rules, when placed in the 
hands of tactically-minded judges, “can sometimes be used as a subterfuge 
to ‘rig’ a desired substantive outcome.”236  Professor Mark Tushnet has 
expressed this worry in the following terms: 
 
intrusive than substantive judicial review’” (quoting Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive 
Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1978))); Linde, supra note 21, at 243 (“It is far 
more cause for resentment to invalidate the substance of a policy that the politically 
accountable branches and their constituents support than to invalidate a lawmaking 
procedure that can be repeated correctly, yet we take substantive judicial review for 
granted.”); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (skipping 
“substantive” equal protection inquiry because a “narrower inquiry discloses that essential 
procedures have not been followed”). 
 234. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial 
Process:  The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (1957). 
 235. See supra notes 7, 24 and accompanying text. 
 236. TRIBE, supra note 131, § 17-3, at 1686; see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, 
at 391–92 (expressing concern over obviously value-laden judgments hidden behind so-
called procedural semisubstantive rulings); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 153 
(“[J]udicial weighing of the adequacy of . . . legislative record . . . is vulnerable to politicized 
application.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:  
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 636–37 (1992) 
(noting “concern that the Court’s new canons represent a form of judicial activism that is 
particularly questionable because it is backdoor” and that the Court may not have “avoided 
the countermajoritarian difficulty . . . [but] only deepened it by engaging in under-the-table 
constitutional lawmaking”); id. at 646 (fearing that “a lack of recognition and candor about 
what the Court has done recently with quasi-constitutional law has submerged a variety of 
hotly contestable normative and empirical issues” and expressing concern about “judicial 
modesty cloaking judicial activism”); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene 
(McCarthy):  The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory 
Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397, 449 (2005) (“[T]he use of 
the [avoidance] canon seems ripe for strategic judicial behavior based on the political 
environment at the time the Court is deciding.”); id. at 446 (arguing that avoidance canon 
“does not promote judicial restraint”); Richard Neely, Obsolete Statutes, Structural Due 
Process, and the Power of Courts to Demand a Second Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 
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In the real world of politics we can predict with great accuracy what the 
effect of suspensory decisions will be. . . . Sometimes we can predict that 
the statute will not be reenacted, in which case structural review has given 
the reality of constraint on legislatures and the illusion of freedom for 
legislatures to do what they want.  Clever judges will invoke structural 
review when they predict that the legislature will be unable to enact 
legislation that contravenes the judges’ personal preferences; they will 
invoke other modes of review in other cases.237 
On its face, this passage suggests that semisubstantive rules may encourage 
judicial mendacity—a serious problem in its own right.  An even graver 
problem involves the abuse of judicial power that this prevarication will 
facilitate.  If in fact “clever judges” often look to use constitutional law to 
advance “personal preferences,” we may assume they are inhibited from 
doing so primarily because the outright invalidation of laws risks intense 
clashes with policy-making authorities.238  On Professor Tushnet’s analysis, 
 
271, 281 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
(1982)) (“The primary objection then to a ‘structural due process’ review power is that the 
power will be used in an unprincipled way, by power-hungry judges, increasing in effect the 
junta-like component of American government.”); Tushnet, supra note 123, at 2792 (noting 
that provisional review may “degenerate into—or may be disguises for—strong-form 
review”). 
  Related to concerns about judicial subterfuge is an argument that attacks the lack of 
fair notice offered by semisubstantive rules.  Professors Philip P. Frickey and Steven S. 
Smith argue that “[t]he Court imposed these requirements retroactively . . . when Congress 
had no notice of the necessity of generating a carefully crafted legislative history.” Frickey 
& Smith, supra note 11, at 1723.  Focusing on Garrett, they note that, even though “the 
Court faced congressional findings of pervasive discrimination against the disabled and an 
elaborate legislative history recounting instances of such discrimination,” it “applied to the 
legislative history a . . . shredding technique, . . . in which the evidence was examined in 
segmented fashion rather than for its cumulative impact.” Id. at 1725–26.  Worse yet, the 
Court would only accept evidence set forth in the official legislative history, id. at 1726, 
while declining to look at even a highly informative task force report that was drafted at the 
request of a House subcommittee, id. at 1735.  In the same vein, Professors Ruth Colker and 
James Brudney fault the Court for requiring Congress to effectively use a “crystal ball.” 
Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 85.  The Justices’ approach, they say, “effectively 
penalizes the enacting Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative record, even 
though such a record requirement could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment 
of legislative deliberation and enactment.” Id.; see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 
133 (arguing that the Court’s second-guessing of legislative procedural choices is 
“particularly pernicious due to its failure to provide guidance on what legislative modes 
would be found adequate”).  At least three responses to these commentators are available:  
(1) they seem to overlook the fact that judicial invalidation of legislation often occurs 
pursuant to newly articulated constitutional rules, including when hard-and-fast judicial 
decision making occurs; (2) they may overstate fair notice concerns because Congress can 
always “play it safe” by anticipating serious process-based review (which, Congress—in 
light of Garrett—surely should and will do in the future when acting pursuant to its 
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power); and (3) these arguments do not seem to be 
directed at semisubstantive rules in general (or not even at legislative findings rules in 
general), but instead at only special applications of those rules, particularly in the Garrett 
case. 
 237. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211. 
 238. See ELY, supra note 8, at 47 (“Thus we are told that the Court’s ‘essentially anti-
democratic character keeps it constantly in jeopardy of destruction’:  it knows ‘that frequent 
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judges might well sidestep this deterrent—while nonetheless achieving “the 
reality of constraint”—by using semisubstantive rules to create “the illusion 
of freedom for legislatures to do what they want.”239  These rules, in short, 
threaten to operate as a sort of stealth bomber in the service of a powerful, 
but otherwise pent-up, tendency toward judicial overreaching.240 
Professor Tushnet’s stated concerns about judicial dissembling, and 
expanded opportunities for judicial overreaching, are subject to challenge 
on a variety of grounds.  First, the argument seems to assume that judges 
often misrepresent the actual reasoning behind their decisions.  Many of us 
will be skeptical of this view, for we believe that judges, by and large, are 
both honest and committed to the essential features of the rule of law.241  
To embrace this sanguine outlook is not to say that judges never act 
strategically.  It is only to say that most judges, most of the time, state their 
reasons accurately in the written opinions on which they place their names.  
And if this is so, there is limited cause for concern about “subterfuge” and 
“illusion” effectuated by way of semisubstantive doctrines. 
It is also doubtful, as the subterfuge argument seems to posit, that 
semisubstantive doctrines are distinctively subject to judicial misuse.242  In 
 
judicial intervention in the political process would generate such widespread political 
reaction that the Court would be destroyed in its wake.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 239. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211; see Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1125 (“It 
is thus possible for a Court, animated by realism, to be constitutionally cautious but 
subconstitutionally activist, even adventurist.”).  Professors William Eskridge and Philip  
Frickey have made a related point in discussing clear-statement rules of statutory 
interpretation: 
Because the Court sees itself as using up political capital every time it invalidates a 
statute, it thinks twice about exercising judicial review.  To the extent the Court 
does not see itself as being “on the spot” when it interprets statutes, it may believe 
it has more freedom to interpret statutes to thwart legislative expectations than it 
does to strike them down. 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 236, at 637. 
 240. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613–14 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(identifying risk that findings requirements may be used as a “covert” form of merits-based 
review).  Christine Bateup makes a related argument.  She says that, even if judges act 
without manipulative intent, legislatures will often be unable to reinstate semisubstantively 
invalidated rules “in practice” because of intervening changes in “political equilibrium” or 
the “salience” of the issue presented. Bateup, supra note 23, at 1131; accord infra notes 
249–51 and accompanying text.  For this reason, she worries that these rules “entail unseen 
democratic costs.” Bateup, supra note 23, at 1131.  This argument, however, raises no 
appreciable cause for worry.  After all, it seems erroneous to say that the judiciary’s scuttling 
of a law raises a “countermajoritarian difficulty” when a current legislative majority in fact 
sees no need to reinstate it. 
 241. See, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED 
OBLIGATION:  THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE A-3 (3d ed. 1997) (“We believe nearly all 
judges try to give their ‘real’ reasons when writing opinions.”); Neil K. Komesar, Taking 
Institutions Seriously:  Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 366, 397 (1984) (deeming it “an unestablished proposition” that “judges employed 
institutional considerations cynically” in Mow Sun Wong and other cases). 
 242. At the least, it is open to question that they are uniquely or distinctively subject to 
use in devious fashion to expand judicial power. See, e.g., Tribe, supra 21, at 284 n.47 (“It is 
worth noting that even rules mechanically applicable carry their own risks for concealing 
illegitimate bases for decision.”). 
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particular, why should we expect potential critics to roll over if courts make 
a manipulative mockery of these tools of decision?  Indeed, those who 
watch for overreaching by judges can decry not only judicial activism, but 
the combination of judicial activism and judicial deception, if and when 
judges pretend to pursue “the reality of constraint” in the sheep’s clothing 
of semisubstantive decision making.  Perhaps this is why there is no strong 
evidence that courts in the past have used semisubstantive rules in 
manipulative ways. 
This absence of evidence may also reflect the powerful practical 
disincentive for using semisubstantive rules if the real goal is to achieve 
preferred substantive outcomes.  The problem is that—despite Professor 
Tushnet’s prognostications to the contrary—the strategic use of 
semisubstantive doctrines “lacks reliability.”243  At the time of Furman v. 
Georgia,244 for example, many thought that that decision, despite its 
semisubstantive bent, spelled the end of the death penalty in this country.245  
Their predictions, to put it mildly, proved inaccurate.  Only four years after 
Furman, the Court rejected Eighth Amendment attacks on the death penalty 
after many state legislatures made careful reappraisals of their capital 
sentencing schemes and reasserted the importance of this form of 
punishment.246 
Difficulties in predicting legislative reactions to provisional rulings are 
heightened by the fact that the very cases in which courts employ 
semisubstantive techniques—typically those cases that involve “suspect 
classifications” or “fundamental rights”—often spark the highest levels of 
political passion.247  Moreover, no one can suggest that semisubstantive 
 
 243. Tribe, supra note 131, § 17-3, at 1686; see also Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of 
the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1964) (“[I]t is easy to misjudge or distort the impact of a Court 
pronouncement, and guesses about that impact are treacherous sources of precepts for Court 
behavior.”). 
 244. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 245. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 201 n.41 (“The Furman decision was 
perceived by many to mean that no capital punishment statute . . . would be constitutionally 
acceptable.”). 
 246. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See generally BICKEL, supra note 8, at 206 (“[T]here 
are dozens of instances, in the federal context, of congressional reversal of the Court, and 
many more instances of the most fruitful interplay between the Court and the legislature or 
the executive, following colloquies initiated by the Justices.”). 
 247. For example, recent partial-birth-abortion litigation has involved hotly contested 
issues regarding the constitutional right-to-choose principle first embraced in Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973).  In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court invalidated 
Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion law. Id. at 936–38.  In a concurring opinion, Justice 
O’Connor anticipated that legislatures could and would attempt to correct the deficiencies in 
the Nebraska statute, and there was no suggestion that she was engaging in any subterfuge 
when she made these remarks. See id. at 950–51 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In fact, 
Congress quickly responded to Stenberg by enacting a national partial-birth-abortion law, 
and the Court upheld this new legislation in part because Congress made new and explicit 
findings about whether there was any medical need for the outlawed procedure. See 
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rulings always lead to de facto invalidations; the near-immediate 
resuscitation of the alien-hiring ban struck down in Mow Sun Wong (no less 
than the aftermath of Furman) puts the lie to any such claim.248 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the strategic-manipulability objection 
is that it pays no heed to the passage of time.  It may be—as Professor 
Tushnet has claimed—that courts often can predict how a then-sitting 
legislature will react to any particular semisubstantive invalidation.  Even if 
they can, however, political tides ebb and flow.  As a result, any 
semisubstantive invalidation is likely to achieve the desired substantive 
outcome only if the composition of the then-sitting political body remains 
unchanged.  For this reason, a court interested in advancing its own 
substantive agenda for anything more than the short term is likely to eschew 
a semisubstantive approach. 
The critic might respond to these observations by noting that political- 
agenda-pursuing judges will use semisubstantive rulings because, even if 
their prognostications of legislative acquiescence prove misplaced, they can 
jump back in and knock out the reenacted program with an outright 
substantive invalidation.  There are too many practical difficulties with this 
chain of reasoning, however, to believe that judges often use it.  A program 
reenacted after a semisubstantive invalidation, for example, may not 
become the subject of a legal challenge for some time.  If the strategically-
minded court is the Supreme Court, for example, any such challenge will 
come before it (at least as an ordinary matter) only after years of processing 
in subordinate tribunals.  Whether the strategically-minded court is the 
Supreme Court or a lower court, the passage of time often will generate new 
judicial appointees (or a new set of panel members in the case of 
intermediate appellate courts), who may well not share their predecessors’ 
substantive agendas.249  And even if a reenacted statute quickly finds its 
way back to the same court that earlier had undone it on semisubstantive 
grounds, a recent legislative endorsement undertaken in response to an 
express judicial invitation hardly provides the ideal condition for an 
outright judicial invalidation.250  Put another way, if a court (and 
particularly, the Supreme Court) invites a dialogue with the political 
branches, it had better be prepared to listen to the response it receives; 
 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007) (noting that Congress found medical 
consensus that the procedure was never medically necessary). 
 248. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 249. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 809, 814 (1983) (“The Supreme Court is an enduring institution with a 
regularly changing membership.”).  The recent partial-birth-abortion decision, handed down 
after Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor, helps to illustrate the point. See supra note 
247. 
 250. See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the 
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 610 (1983) (“[T]he courts need to remember that 
confrontation with the policy-makers puts the delicate nature of the separation of powers to 
great stress.”). 
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otherwise, it risks endangering the goodwill on which all of its authority 
ultimately depends.251 
F.  Argument 6 (Doctrinal Distortion):  Semisubstantive Decision Making 
Has the “Vice” of the “Passive Virtues” Because It Invites Distortion of 
Otherwise-Useful Substantive Constitutional Doctrines 
During the early 1960s, Professor Bickel made the case that the Supreme 
Court should cleave to the “[p]assive [v]irtues,”252 working hard to avoid 
head-on conflicts with the political branches over the constitutionality of 
government programs.253  Methods for averting confrontation included 
broad use of discretionary justiciability rules,254 an open-stanced 
willingness to decline statutory jurisdiction,255 increased deployment of the 
nondelegation principle,256 and (of particular importance for present 
purposes) ready invocation of the vagueness and desuetude-statute rules.257 
In a famous article, Professor Gerald Gunther responded that these 
“passive virtues” were fraught with “subtle vices.”258  The Gunther critique 
had three main parts.  First, he argued that Professor Bickel had tossed aside 
a “principled concern with threshold questions”259 in favor of an 
expediency-driven “free-wheeling” style of inviting legislative second 
looks.260  Next, Professor Gunther urged that this “‘passive virtues’” 
approach did not so much encourage judicial restraint as foster judicial 
dishonesty and abdication.261  Finally, Professor Gunther blasted Professor 
Bickel for advocating the payment of these costs to gain only a paltry 
benefit:  the sometime avoidance of a supposed judicial “legitimation” of 
troubling government programs not subject to principled invalidation.262  In 
short, according to Professor Gunther, Professor Bickel offered the Court 
too much discretion to take too little action to secure no meaningful 
advantage. 
The full force of Professor Gunther’s argument cannot be captured in one 
paragraph.  But precisely because it is so powerful, that critique provides 
the platform for an argument against semisubstantive rules under reasoning 
that goes something like this:  semisubstantive rules, by definition, involve 
second-look remands to government policymakers, and the encouragement 
 
 251. See id. (“[The] independent judiciary can remain that way only if the other branches 
accept the importance of its independence.”). 
 252. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 111. 
 253. See id. at 112. 
 254. Id. at 183. 
 255. Id. at 127. 
 256. Id. at 159–61. 
 257. Id. at 147–56. 
 258. See generally Gunther, supra note 243.  
 259. Id. at 17. 
 260. Id. at 25; see id. at 21 (“Bickel invites . . . risks by viewing narrow constitutional 
doctrines such as vagueness as essentially unprincipled means to avoid premature hardening 
of substantive constitutional limitations.”). 
 261. Id. at 22–24. 
 262. Id. at 5–9. 
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of such remands was at the heart of Professor Bickel’s agenda; Professor 
Gunther challenged the Bickel program with a ravaging brilliance; thus 
semisubstantive rules must go. 
This line of logic, while superficially appealing, fails because there is a 
broken link in its chain of inferences.  The problem is that Professor 
Gunther went after Professor Bickel’s larger project; he did not go after 
semisubstantive rules.263  In mounting his critique, for example, Professor 
Gunther voiced no objection to the vagueness doctrine or its 
“instrumental[ist] purposes.”264  Rather, he challenged Professor Bickel’s 
enthusiasm for using this doctrine and others as mere “devices”265 and 
“unprincipled means”266 to “avoid legitimation at all costs.”267  To criticize 
the unprincipled use of a rule is not to criticize the rule itself.  In other 
words, Professor Gunther’s critique casts no doubt on any semisubstantive 
doctrine (including the vagueness rule) that is applied in a properly 
principled manner. 
Building on the work of Professor Gunther, then-Professor (and now-
Judge) Calabresi raised a related set of questions about constitutionally 
inspired semisubstantive doctrines.268  In doing so, he wrote, 
Vagueness, delegation of authority, desuetude, yes, even ‘interpretation of 
statutes,’ are doctrines and notions that have a meaning and function of 
their own.  Vagueness and desuetude, for example, are designed to require 
that actors be warned of the possible consequences of their actions before 
they act. . . . When such doctrines and notions are used not to achieve 
these tasks but rather to require or induce legislatures to take a second 
look, they are altered and become incapable of achieving their original 
functions. . . . Gunther was worried about such false use of doctrines, 
even in paraconstitutional cases.  His worry [was] that this would lead to a 
‘virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism’ and involve the courts 
in dangerous subterfuges . . . .269 
 
 263. Another, separate problem is that the great bulk of Professor Gerald Gunther’s 
treatment of Bickelian doctrines dealt with matters of jurisdiction and justiciability.  That 
treatment may well have merit.  But it possesses not a molehill of relevance with regard to 
the separate subject of whether courts should use semisubstantive rules. 
 264. Gunther, supra note 243, at 21.  For a discussion of the semisubstantive, attention-
focusing role of the vagueness rule, see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1629–30, 1795–800. 
 265. Gunther, supra note 243, at 20. 
 266. Id. at 21. 
 267. Id. at 15.  In like fashion, Professor Gunther had no problem with clear-statement-
based semisubstantive rules despite their remand-to-the-legislature qualities.  After all, 
political leaders have traditionally legislated against the backdrop of constitutionally driven 
clear-statement rules, including the substantial-constitutional-question avoidance rule.  In 
these circumstances, legislators were (and still are) on fair notice that statutes that approach 
the limits of constitutionality will receive a thorough judicial going-over.  For this reason, 
according to Professor Gunther, so long as courts tie second-look rules to the genuine 
presence of ambiguity, critics cannot fault courts for engaging in “dangerous subterfuges,” 
CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 20 (discussing Gunther’s view), or “free-wheeling 
interventionism,” Gunther, supra note 243, at 25. 
 268. CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 20. 
 269. Id. at 19–20 (quoting Gunther, supra note 243, at 25). 
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Judge Calabresi rightly noted that the “false use” of doctrine is not a good 
thing.  But any “false use” criticism requires a clear understanding of what a 
“true use” is.  The Court, for example, has made it clear that the vagueness 
rule involves far more than ensuring “that actors be warned of the possible 
consequences of their actions.”270  Indeed, Judge Calabresi himself went on 
to recognize that it is “correct and uncontroversial” to view the doctrine as 
“a temporizing device” that pushes political actors to take a “second look” 
at policies that are both ambiguously articulated and constitutionally 
problematic.271  If this is true, inclusion of the vagueness doctrine in the 
semisubstantive-rule tool kit poses no difficulty.  After all, if the vagueness 
doctrine has a process-tied purpose, its use for process-tied reasons cannot 
be decried as using “‘tricks.’”272 
There is a broader point to make about Judge Calabresi’s expression of 
concern about constitutionally driven semisubstantive rules.  The point is 
that he considered these rules from the distinctive perspective of exploring 
the specialized subject of his provocative book—that is, the subject of how 
to deal with the continued operation of numerous unrepealed statutes long 
since made antiquated by changed conditions.273  The core of Judge 
Calabresi’s argument was that the use of constitutionally driven 
semisubstantive rules provides a crudely underinclusive way to deal with 
this problem, especially because many outdated statutes do not present 
serious substantive constitutional difficulties.274  Judge Calabresi’s 
“underinclusiveness” argument may make sense, but it does not undermine 
the argument for constitutionally driven semisubstantive rules.  The reason 
why is that the unifying purpose of these rules is not to get rid of archaic 
statutes.275  If there is a need for a legal tool to clear away a sprawling 
underbrush of outdated enactments, such a tool should be forged.  But the 
creation or noncreation of such a rule does not bear on the legitimacy of 
semisubstantive doctrines that have an independently valuable role to play 
as a specialized part of our constitutional law.  Indeed, as we have seen in 
examining assisted suicide laws, Judge Calabresi himself embraced with 
enthusiasm constitutionally driven semisubstantive decision making.276 
 
 270. Id. at 19. 
 271. Id. at 17. 
 272. Id. at 20.  
 273. See generally id. at 1–3 (outlining overarching concerns that gave rise to the book). 
 274. Id. at 20. 
 275. Id. at 22–23.  Indeed, eight of the nine doctrines of semisubstantive constitutional 
law have nothing to do with a statute’s outdatedness. See supra note 22 (itemizing nine 
doctrines). 
 276. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (discussing Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 
716, 732–35 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring)).  In particular, he warmly embraced 
constitutionally driven semisubstantive reasoning in voting to invalidate an assisted suicide 
ban enacted in “another age,” long before the development of modern medicine and moral 
outlooks that bear upon the subject. Id. at 732.  As he explained, 
  When legislation comes close to violating fundamental substantive 
constitutional rights or to running counter to the requirements of Equal 
Protection, . . . there is . . . a long tradition of constitutional holdings that inertia 
will not do.  In such instances, courts have asserted the right to strike down statutes 
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In sum, the Gunther and Calabresi analyses provide no problem for 
semisubstantive rules.  The probing work of these analysts hits around our 
subject.  In the end, however, that work exposes semisubstantive doctrines 
only to smoke, not to fire. 
G.  Argument 7 (Futility):  Structural Rules Are Rules of Futility—And Not 
Legitimate Constitutional Rules at All—Because Policymakers Are Free 
Simply To Readopt Any Program Invalidated Pursuant to Such a Rule 
Arguments 1 through 6 proceed from the premise that structural rules 
empower courts to do too much.  Argument 7, in contrast, posits that these 
rules empower courts to do too little.  In particular, it has been said that 
“structural review is not constitutional review at all” because “it imposes no 
substantive limitations on legislative activity.”277  This critique begs the 
question.  Nothing in the Constitution says that that document imposes only 
“substantive limitations on legislative activity.”  Indeed, two key provisions 
speak of “due process of law,”278 while other guarantees that are typically 
seen as substantive in nature have spawned all sorts of process-centered 
doctrines.279  Against this doctrinal backdrop, it rings hollow to assert that 
structural review in its nature “conflicts with the premises of constitutional 
theory.”280 
It is particularly inaccurate—indeed, inaccurate in the extreme—to 
describe semisubstantive review as entailing “futility.”281  As Professor 
Theodore Eisenberg has observed in discussing constitutional “why” rules, 
Some [lawmakers], after being informed that they initially acted 
unconstitutionally, may refuse to vote for reenactment.  [And] if a statute 
 
and, before ruling on the ultimate validity of that legislation, to demand a present 
and positive acknowledgment of the values that the legislators wish to further 
through the legislation in issue. 
Id. at 735 (emphasis added).  In short, Judge Guido Calabresi himself came to embrace the 
use of time-tied rules, at least in this instance, as a vehicle for protecting substantive 
constitutional values. 
 277. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211; see also Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 
U.S. 220, 224 (1949) (“[A] judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which 
may have determined legislators’ votes.”). 
 278. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see also supra note 
21. 
 279. In public official defamation cases, for example, many procedural rules serve to 
protect First Amendment values. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
254 (1986) (holding that on motion for summary judgment, lower courts must inquire into 
convincing clarity of actual malice); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 
(1986) (noting plaintiff has burden of proof in cases governed by New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), or Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)); Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500–03 (1984) (requiring appellate 
courts to review de novo whether evidence of actual malice was clear and convincing); N.Y. 
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80 (evidence must show statement was made with actual 
malice). 
 280. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211. 
 281. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (noting that there exists an “element 
of futility” in a motive based invalidation of a law). 
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is invalidated on judicial review, the legislature often will decline or fail 
to consider a new law.  In many situations, therefore, judicial action on 
the basis of motive results in an effective, not a futile, invalidation.282 
At a minimum, remands to the legislature have the powerful effect of 
shifting the “burden of inertia.”283  They also have practical impacts 
because (as we have seen) members of legislative bodies come and go over 
time.284  What is more, these rules always carry with them judicial 
instructions that may focus, deepen, or otherwise reshape political-branch 
decision making.285  Indeed, some semisubstantive rulings create very high 
odds of enduring practical consequences; rules focused on forcing 
reassessments of statutes that appear to have outlived their usefulness 
illustrate the point.286 
 
 282. Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive:  Theories of 
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 116 (1977). 
 283. Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 918 n.253 (arguing that “merely shifting the 
burden of inertia in the policymaking process itself can be significant” because proponents 
of the invalidated law must bear the burden of lobbying Congress; because it is easier to 
defeat legislation than obtain its passage, a remand to Congress “may as a practical matter 
result in a policy’s ultimate demise”); see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
CONFLICT 365 (1992) (“Legislation is always easier to block than to enact. . . . [T]his 
provides significant added protection to the party who stands to gain from legislative 
inaction.”). 
 284. This point seems to answer any argument that interest group pressures all but ensure 
that “remanding an issue to the legislature . . . is futile because the mechanistic process of 
legislation eliminates the possibility of a thoughtful legislative response.” Farber & Frickey, 
supra note 203, at 876.  What is more, this is the case even if one deems interest-group 
pressures as decisive in the lawmaking process.  Due to time’s passage, a judicially ordered 
second look may protect constitutional values by mandating an affirmative override of them 
by a legislature whose members represent interests quite different from the interests 
represented by the members of the initially enacting legislature.  Professors Daniel Farber 
and Philip P. Frickey make this point in forceful terms: 
To be sure, judicial invalidation under this approach constitutes only a suspensive 
veto.  Yet even that shifts the burden of inertia to those seeking to reimpose the 
invalidated decision, highlights the perceived unfairness of the decision, and, 
because of the passage of time, often presents the issue to a legislature constituted 
somewhat differently from the one that made the original decision.  Considering 
the ease of killing legislation and the difficulty of passing it, these consequences of 
a suspensive veto are significant. 
Id. at 923. 
 285. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 25, at 17–18 (arguing that political allies of the Court 
“will often have sufficient strength to deter elected officials from reversing a judicial 
decision that vindicates the Constitution, especially after a judicial decision signals a conflict 
of constitutional magnitude”).  Judge Calabresi has expressed worry that second-look rulings 
may shape legislative behavior in negative ways.  He supposes, for example, that some state 
legislators made post-Furman votes for the death penalty on the ground of political 
expediency because they assumed the courts would strike down any newly enacted law. 
CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 26–27.  This concern, however, is speculative and probably 
overdrawn.  In any event, the proper solution to this problem, if it exists, is not for judges to 
scrap semisubstantive rules altogether, but for legislators to act responsibly.  If judges want a 
sober second look, they should tell legislators exactly that, and legislators in turn should not 
assume that judges do not mean what they say. 
 286. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 1874 (noting strong possibility of law-reform effects 
worked by time-tied “when” rules). 
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All of these observations show why lawmakers often will not 
automatically respond to suspensive interventions with program 
reenactments.287  But even if the futility argument did have empirical 
validity, that argument would be open to serious challenge on the ground 
that there is value in proper process itself.  Do we really want courts to turn 
a blind eye when they learn that a state’s facially neutral voter-
disenfranchisement rule was the product of rank racist hatred?288  Do we 
really want courts to stand idly by when they discover that a sloppily 
slapped-together affirmative action program came about due to a spoils 
system based on skin color?289  In cases of this nature, even if reenactment 
of the program is predictable, concerns about the integrity and legitimacy of 
government behavior push hard for at least a thoughtful reconsideration.  
Just as rules of procedural due process in the adjudicative context have an 
“intrinsic value” apart from “the right to secure a different outcome,”290 
semisubstantive safeguards have a role to play in “‘generating the feeling, 
so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.’”291 
H.  Argument 8 (Constitutional Underenforcement):  Semisubstantive Rules 
Will Induce Courts To Underenforce Constitutional Norms 
The futile-gesture argument suggests that judges who wield 
semisubstantive doctrines do too little because they do nothing at all.  As 
we have seen, this logic is faulty.292  There is, however, a related argument 
that raises a greater concern.  That argument posits that semisubstantive 
safeguards may cause courts to under-judge.293  The idea is that the 
 
 287. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 166 (“The Court’s action in remanding the issue to 
Congress [in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958),] bore some fruit.  Hearings and quite 
extensive consideration followed, and a relatively moderate and well-drawn bill passed the 
House.  In the Senate there were hearings and a number of bills, but in the end no legislation, 
at least not yet.”); Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 923–24 (noting President 
Eisenhower’s failure to secure congressional reinstatement of travel ban struck down in 
Kent); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 337, 377–78, 416 (1991) (noting the infrequency with which 
judicial interpretations of statutes are overridden by Congress).  If further evidence of 
nonfutility is needed, it is supplied by the experience of other nations. See Bateup, supra 
note 23, at 1120 (suggesting that override power available to the legislative branch, under the 
Canadian Constitution, “has rarely been employed”); Ward, supra note 25, at 20 n.61 
(agreeing that the legislative override in Canada “has not played a significant role” and 
collecting authorities). 
 288. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); supra notes 80–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 289. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989), the Court 
detected just such a risk, although three dissenters argued vigorously that they were wrong. 
 290. TRIBE, supra note 131, § 10-7, at 666. 
 291. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 292. See supra notes 281–87 and accompanying text. 
 293. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 104 n.71 (“When he first described such a scheme of 
judicial review, Bickel was criticized for providing too narrow and conservative a role for 
the judiciary.”); Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 391–92 (“[I]f due process of lawmaking was 
employed only where strict scrutiny otherwise applied, it might end up displacing 
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availability of semisubstantive rules will lead judicial authorities to use 
these rules to the exclusion of hard-and-fast substantive doctrines that form 
the proper core of constitutional law.  In other words, because 
semisubstantive doctrines are available, judges will use them too much, use 
substantive rules too little, and thus underenforce important constitutional 
norms.294 
This argument has force if its basic premise is true, for constitutional 
rules should be suspect if in fact they lead to an unwarranted dilution of 
constitutional rights.  There is, however, a difficulty with the argument 
because its underlying premise is doubtful.  To begin with, the 
underenforcement argument seems to posit—contrary to the history most of 
us remember—that judges have a disinclination to use hard-and-fast rules 
of constitutional decision making.295  In fact, the present-day Court uses 
hard-and-fast rules with regularity despite the ready availability of 
semisubstantive doctrinal alternatives.296  No less important, the availability 
of semisubstantive rules may well cause courts to vindicate constitutional 
norms by way of a second-look approach when those norms would 
 
substantive judicial review altogether.”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1149 (noting 
“scruples about . . . possible devaluation of the Constitution” inherent in constitutional 
common law); cf. Bateup, supra note 23, at 1130 (expressing worry about the way in which 
semisubstantive rules and substantive rules of judicial decision making interact, particularly 
as to when courts should use one technique or the other). 
 294. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1165 (“[S]ubconstitutionalizing 
rights places them on a less firm foundation, since a common law rule is reversible by 
Congress while a constitutional right is not.”); see also Calabresi, supra note 21, at 135–36 
(“I would avoid the application of [hard-and-fast] protections to even such popular, open-
ended concepts as the ‘right to privacy.’”); Sandalow, supra note 29, at 1190 (arguing that 
the perceived need to use judicial review to protect minorities should be tempered with an 
understanding that “the political process leading to [legislative] decisions contains 
prodigious internal safeguards for [minorities’] interests,” particularly in the “effect upon the 
political process of the extraordinary variety of interest groups . . . and the crosscutting 
loyalties and identifications that exist among the members of such groups”).  Professors 
William Buzbee and Robert Schapiro argue that the Court “should take responsibility for the 
decision and not attempt to shift the blame to Congress” by using semisubstantive rules. 
Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 143; see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 375 
(arguing that the Court has a duty to strike an unconstitutional statute and “may not properly 
avoid this responsibility by conditioning its adherence to the statute on congressional 
compliance with procedural requirements beyond those set forth in Article I, Section 7”). 
 295. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 21, at 135 (noting that there is “consensus over the 
propriety of [hard-and-fast] protection for certain categories of rights,” including “at least . . . 
most of the enumerated rights”). 
 296. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy law 
on substantive due process grounds); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–19 
(2000) (invalidating federal sex-based violence law on federalism grounds even though 
states widely supported it and Congress made extensive findings designed to show effects on 
interstate commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180–83 (1992) (rejecting 
defense of federal legislation that “commandeered” regulatory processes of New York, 
despite the involvement and support of state officials in the act’s passage); Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (asserting, in striking 
down restrictions on speech not justified by a compelling state interest, that “we do not 
assume a legislative role, but fulfill our judicial duty—to enforce the demands of the 
Constitution”). 
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otherwise go wholly unprotected.297  Put another way, the use of 
semisubstantive review may induce courts to give constitutional rights a 
measure of protection they would not receive if only hard-and-fast rules 
were on the scene.  Indeed, for this reason, the availability of 
semisubstantive rules may well cause courts to avoid underenforcing 
constitutional protections. 
How all of this comes out in the wash is not apparent.  But there is little 
reason to suppose that, all things considered, judicial use of semisubstantive 
doctrines will lead to an underenforcement of constitutional rights.298 
I.  Argument 9 (Flawed Premises):  Semisubstantive Rules—Or at Least 
Many of Them—Rest on Simplistic or Contrived Notions About the Nature 
of Lawmaking Processes 
Rules that target political processes should reflect political realities.  Do 
semisubstantive doctrines comport with this notion?  Some commentators 
have claimed they do not.  Professor Tushnet, for example, has asserted that 
the Court ignored political realities in issuing such structural decisions as 
Bakke and Mow Sun Wong.299  In the latter case, he says, the Court erred in 
assuming that the Federal Civil Service Commission myopically focused on 
employment-efficiency issues, while paying no attention whatsoever to 
foreign policy concerns.  The problem with this reasoning, Professor 
Tushnet says, is that the outlawed rule was “undoubtedly produced after a 
study by members of the Commission’s staff, who most certainly consulted 
both formally and informally with members of other staffs knowledgeable 
 
 297. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 192, at 468 (reasoning that courts may underenforce 
constitutional rights if only hard-and-fast review is available, but that courts can close the 
gap by engaging in aggressive statutory construction that vindicates constitutional norms); 
see also Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term—Foreword:  A Political Court, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 89 (2005) (noting in his discussion on the significance of 
constitutional amendment processes that “[j]ust as dogs bark more ferociously when they are 
behind a fence, judges indulge their personal views more blatantly when they know they 
don’t have the last word”). 
 298. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 29, at 52 (“[T]he Court would remain the ‘ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution’—indeed, a more powerful and effective interpreter, given the 
addition of a new and important jurisprudential tool that would supplement, not replace, the 
Court’s traditional practice of final judicial review.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962))); see also 
Calabresi, supra note 21, at 103 (noting that even “Bickel did not, of course, believe in 
courts having only [a semisubstantive] function” but that he supported use of traditional 
hard-and-fast judicial review as well); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 79 (1985) (arguing that the “original constitutional 
framework was based on an understanding that national representatives should be largely 
insulated from constituent pressures,” and that, with the decline of that system, “it is neither 
surprising nor inappropriate that the judicial role has expanded [so] that some of the 
deliberative tasks no longer performed by national representatives have been transferred to 
the courts”). 
 299. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 207; see also supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text 
(discussing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hampton v. Mow 
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)). 
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about foreign policy.”300  Likewise, he asserts that Justice Powell erred in 
assuming in Bakke that the University of California, Davis, admissions 
program “was paid not the slightest bit of attention” by the politically 
accountable California legislature when that legislature had an obvious 
interest in overseeing key affirmative-action decisions made by college 
administrators.301  Thus, each of these rulings, he concludes, “is predicated 
on a vision of an imaginary policymaking process.”302 
At the outset, it bears noting that Professor Tushnet’s comments are 
directed only at “who” rules and, for that matter, at only two who-rule 
cases; those comments thus cast no shadow over other semisubstantive 
doctrines.  No less important, Professor Tushnet’s critique of Mow Sun 
Wong and Bakke is itself overdrawn.  For example, in pooh-poohing the up-
the-chain-of-command “who” rule of Bakke, Professor Tushnet asserts that 
state legislators—no less than university officials—“are insulated from 
political accountability” because “incumbents have an automatic electoral 
advantage against opponents.”303  But state legislators (unlike university 
officials) are subject to election, and their “electoral advantage” is not an 
electoral lock (particularly if they take unpopular positions on the 
concededly “sensitive” and “controversial” issues raised by affirmative 
action programs).304  Even more important, Professor Tushnet’s 
minimization of the differing levels of accountability of agencies and 
legislatures ignores elementary principles of political science.  Those 
principles, after all, leave no doubt that “constituent and contributor 
interests [do] influence legislators” in a way they do not influence 
appointed officials because “reelection is an important motive.”305 
In any event, one can embrace Professor Tushnet’s premises without 
endorsing his conclusions.  It is true that policymaking systems are 
“complex”306 and that different decision-making units—for example, the 
Civil Service Commission and the President in one instance, or the 
California legislature and the state Board of Regents in another—are not 
sealed off from one another with hermetic neatness.  It is also the case, 
however, that different decision-making bodies do have different 
competencies, different constituencies, and different capacities for 
deliberation, representation, and accountability.  With regard to Mow Sun 
Wong, for example, even Professor Tushnet concedes that “the 
Commission’s staff process would probably give more weight to personnel 
considerations and less to foreign policy [considerations] than the 
President’s staff process would.”307  But if that is true, the Court’s who-
based reasoning in the case is defensible for that very reason. 
 
 300. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 206 (emphasis added). 
 301. Id. at 207. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 207–08. 
 305. Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 900. 
 306. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 207. 
 307. Id. at 207 n.48. 
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Finally, it is important not to throw out the baby with the bathwater.308  
Proper development of semisubstantive safeguards—like proper 
development of all constitutional rules—necessarily will turn on contextual 
decisions made by conscientious judges confronted with an unfolding series 
of cases.  If, in this process, it appears that a particular semisubstantive 
“who” rule “misconceives the policymaking process,”309 the proper 
response is not to junk “who” rules altogether.  Instead, the proper response 
is to reshape those rules to bring them more in line with policymaking 
realities. 
This same point helps to diminish the force of attacks on findings-and-
study-based “how” rules, such as the rule deployed in Garrett.310  In recent 
years, a cottage industry of criticism directed at these rules has sprung up in 
the academic community.311  One complaint is that findings-and-study rules 
mistakenly equate legislatures with administrative agencies.312  The 
overarching point is that so-called “hard-look” rules have long and properly 
been directed at administrative agencies in light of their distinctive 
characteristics—such as a lack of electoral accountability and a duty to 
implement statutory mandates—that legislative bodies do not share.313  
 
 308. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1371–75 (discussing frequency with which the 
Rehnquist Court has shown openness to applying “‘who’” rules). 
 309. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 206. 
 310. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 311. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 332–39, 383–86 (noting that formal 
legislative record does not reveal proper reliance upon informal and extrarecord sources such 
as views of constituents, ex parte communications with interest groups, and information 
gathered by congressional agencies); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 96 (“No set of 
compiled written materials will provide a comprehensive record of what influenced 
legislative action.”); Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 117 (asserting that semisubstantive 
rules “[fail] to appreciate the skill and sophistication that Congress brings” in legislation 
“through a range of informal contacts”).  Of particular significance, Professor Frickey—who 
serves as something of a jedi-master in this field—has stepped back from his earlier 
optimism about findings-and-study rules to take a far more skeptical stance. Compare 
Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1733–36 (listing a myriad of problems with findings-and-
study rules), with Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 926 (“‘[D]ue process of lawmaking’ 
has the potential to strengthen the democratic process.”); Frickey, supra note 228, at 697–98.  
For some less critical appraisals, see Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial 
Signals:  A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
757, 760 (1996) (suggesting that findings-and-study rules may “facilitate the exercise of 
judicial review and improve interbranch communication”); Harold J. Krent, Turning 
Congress into an Agency:  The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 731, 733–34 (1996) (noting the rule’s potential to increase accountability and 
help in vindicating otherwise underenforced constitutional norms). 
 312. See Krent, supra note 311, at 746 (“Treating Congress as a glorified administrative 
agency cuts against our system of government, which embraces the norm of majoritarian rule 
through the democratic process.”); see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 331 (“[T]he 
reasons that justify ‘on-the-record’ review in the administrative [agency] context . . . do not 
apply to the legislative branch.”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 120 (arguing that 
legislative record review is similar to administrative action review, but even “more 
probing”). 
 313. See Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules 
and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1997) (noting necessity of external 
monitoring, in light of bureaucrats’ “lack of political accountability”). 
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These reasons for applying hard-look rules to agencies do not apply to 
legislatures.  Thus (so the argument goes) it makes no sense to apply these 
sorts of rules in policing the enactment of a statute. 
Semisubstantive findings-and-study rules, however, may benefit 
lawmaking processes even if the challenges faced by legislatures differ 
greatly from the challenges faced by agencies.314  Heart disease and 
headaches are very different things.  This fact does not mean, however, that 
aspirin cannot work effectively against both conditions.  Put another way, 
the question is not whether agencies and legislatures are different. The 
question is whether, even though they are different, findings-and-study 
rules (that target legislatures only when specialized constitutional dangers 
are present) have a useful role to play in safeguarding constitutional values.  
And there are a variety of reasons to conclude they do.315 
Critics of findings-and-study rules also focus on the many impediments 
that get in the way of legislative consideration of constitutional concerns.  
In their view, it makes little sense to remand matters to legislatures so that 
they can reconsider constitutional difficulties when legislatures by nature 
lack adeptness in processing constitutional arguments.316  No one contends, 
however, that findings-and-study rules are a lawmaking panacea.  Rather, 
their function is to poke and nudge.317  It may be—as critics assert—that 
most legislative findings concerning constitutional matters end up being 
 
 314. See, e.g., Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (justifying findings-and-study approach in part based on “the unfortunate fact 
that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should”); Goldfeld, supra 
note 25, at 370 (suggesting value of findings-based rule when “a particular policy did not 
receive even minimal deliberation,” which can happen in legislative process, in part because 
of floor amendments). 
 315. See supra notes 58–68 and accompanying text.  An ancillary argument in this 
context is that forcing Congress to create a substantive legislative record overlooks resulting 
opportunity costs; put another way, legislatures may have to forego valuable alternative 
activities because they have to adhere to the Court’s findings-and-study rules. Bryant & 
Simeone, supra note 30, at 384 (asserting that “[b]y imposing on Congress the duty to create 
a record . . . the Court threatens to limit the other legitimate purposes served by 
congressional proceedings” and that the Court’s approach “will likely have the undesirable 
consequence of diverting scarce congressional resources”); Colker & Brudney, supra note 
30, at 120 (arguing that “[r]edirecting Congress’s way of doing business . . . imposes 
substantial opportunity costs”); see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 135 (stating 
that, while the Court does “not prohibit . . . informal modes of communication and 
access, . . . by creating a requirement that the legislature establish a recorded factual basis for 
a legislative action, the Court has created incentives for a shift in emphasis . . . to more 
formal modes of deliberation”).  One answer to this critique is that it seems unduly alarmist.  
The Court has not signaled that findings-centered review techniques will apply large 
numbers of legislative undertakings.  Rather, all signs indicate that the Court has reserved 
this style of review only for cases that involve particularly sensitive constitutional issues. See 
supra notes 25, 123 and accompanying text. 
 316. See, e.g., Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1745 (asserting that “when conflict of 
interests is present and when policy is therefore constructed through a competitive process of 
coalition building, bargaining, and voting, the Court is asking too much” when it requires 
agency-like behavior of Congress). 
 317. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 37 (“[C]ourts should provide spurs and prods 
when . . . deliberation is absent.”). 
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written by committee personnel who are excessively responsive to interest 
group demands.318  Even if this is the case, however, at least some people at 
some level in the lawmaking process are giving some attention to 
constitutional values.319  Critics also argue that most representatives 
couldn’t care less about findings and studies because ensuring reelection, 
fundraising, and vote-trading dominate their thoughts.320  Even so, shining 
a light on enduring principles may influence at least some legislators’ 
thinking.  It also will send a proper message to lawmakers that, in all their 
work, they must keep the Constitution in view.321 
Finally, it may be that legislative findings have a busy-work quality.322  
At the least, however, findings-and-study rules often generate the practical 
consequence of triggering the remand of a previously enacted law to the 
legislature for a second look.  When semisubstantive rules have this effect, 
they couple bi-temporalism with bicameralism in a way that impedes 
precisely the sort of “rash and hasty” decision making that most concerned 
the Framers.323  What is more, in the face of a judicial remand, elected 
officials cannot simply ignore what the court has done.  Proponents of the 
scuttled legislation will have to consider why the court demanded further 
action; otherwise they can have no assurance that their efforts at reinstating 
the law will prove effective.324  Political-branch adversaries of the 
 
 318. See Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 418 (noting that some groups question the use of 
legislative history in statutory interpretation “in part to minimize the influence of interest 
groups—because such groups are able to get language into legislative history that they are 
unable to get into statutory language”). 
 319. Cf. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:  A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 610–12 (2002) (suggesting that “lobbyist 
involvement [may] actually [be] a form of deliberation and participation”). 
 320. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword:  The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1979) (emphasizing that legislatures “see their primary 
function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people—what they 
want and what they believe should be done”); Mikva, supra note 250, at 606 (“[F]or the 
most part the legislators are motivated by a desire to enact any particular piece of legislation 
that fills the perceived needs of the moment.”); id. at 588 (adding that legislatures are not 
“‘institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values’” (quoting Fiss, 
supra, at 10)). 
 321. Findings-and-study rules may serve other purposes as well. See, e.g., Goldfeld, 
supra note 25, at 369 (“[P]lacing a floor on the level of deliberation required to enact a law 
could help improve the quality of . . . political accountability.”); see also supra note 203 
(noting possible benefits of diminishing tensions between Congress and the courts and of 
enhancing the quality of judicial review by supplying useful information). 
 322. Sunstein, supra note 298, at 76 (claiming that, if representatives were forced to act in 
Madisonian mold, they would, at most, produce “‘boilerplate’—rationalizations designed to 
placate the courts—rather than a genuine critical inquiry into issues of value and fact”). 
 323. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 61 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (quoting A 
Citizen, CARLISLE GAZETTE & WESTERN REPOSITORY OF KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 24, 1787); see 
also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:  Printz and Principle, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2240 n.261 (1998) (noting that requiring Congress to gather facts, 
even absent a remand, “may lengthen time for deliberation”). See generally supra notes 143–
50 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about passionate, short-sighted action of 
political decision makers expressed in The Federalist). 
 324. See supra notes 11, 14–15, 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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legislation are also sure to take heed of the court’s directives.  Those 
directives after all, will point out difficulties with the provisionally 
invalidated measure (as well as potential obstacles to its successful 
reenactment), thus “call[ing] forth . . . opposition” and providing that 
opposition with useful tools of argument.325  In short, a judicial remand 
inevitably requires reconsideration after the passage of time, while creating 
some measure of heightened focus on constitutional complications as that 
reconsideration occurs.  It seems plausible to conclude that, at least 
sometimes, these conditions will cause legislatures to resurrect 
provisionally invalidated laws only if especially powerful justifications for 
reviving them exist.326 
Legislative findings-and-study rules cannot purge passions and raw 
politics from all instances of legislative behavior.  At the same time, it is 
hard to see what better tools courts can use to push along the sort of 
meaningful deliberation the Framers envisioned when pressing risks to 
basic rights or constitutional structures appear.327  In the end, critiques of 
findings-and-study rules both ask too much of, and fear too much from, this 
form of semisubstantive review.  Legislative findings-and-study rules do 
not seek to move the earth.  Rather, they operate in modest fashion, in a 
limited number of settings, to tilt lawmaking processes in such a direction 
that they will take some account of important constitutional values.328  In 
this way, findings-and-study rules promote—in a distinctively self-limiting 
and minimally disruptive way—the most salient purposes of our 
constitutional plan. 
J.  Argument 10 (Novelty):  Structural Rules Should Be Viewed as Suspect 
and Unstable Because They Depart from the Path Ordinarily Traveled in 
the Formulation of Constitutional Law 
If this Article has accomplished nothing else, it has dismantled any 
challenge to semisubstantive rules based on the notion that they are new 
and exotic.329  In fact, semisubstantive rules draw strong support from 
 
 325. This point was highlighted to me in informal communication with Professor (and 
former Oregon Supreme Court Justice) Hans Linde. 
 326. It is true, of course, that in some circumstances, “especially powerful justifications” 
will not exist, but that instead, reenactment of the same or a similar law will result from the 
exertion of raw political power of self-interest groups.  Even in these cases, however, 
shifting the burden of inertia onto the backs of those groups will at least ensure that the law 
is reenacted in response to distinctively powerful democratic forces.  And if no genuinely 
public-regarding justification for the law is identifiable, it remains open to courts to 
invalidate the law pursuant to due-process or equal-protection rationality review. See CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 29 (3d ed. 1997) (describing rationality review as a 
requirement that “public measures must be a minimally reasonable effort to promote some 
public value”). 
 327. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text (collecting passages on this point 
from The Federalist). 
 328. See supra notes 317–19 and accompanying text. 
 329. This Article does not stand alone in pointing out the deep historical tradition of 
semisubstantive rules. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 70–71 (stating that “over the years, [the 
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related principles—like First Amendment procedural rules330 and means-
driven doctrines331—that are settled features of the constitutional landscape.  
Even more important, many semisubstantive tools of decision making—
such as motive-based doctrines,332 clear statement rules,333 and 
constitutional common law334—have roots that reach back to the earliest 
days of the Republic. 
Most important of all, semisubstantive interventions are both numerous 
and increasingly common in the Supreme Court’s modern-day work.335  
The Court’s many structural decisions thus work hand in hand to lend 
precedential support to one another.  That there are four major strains of 
semisubstantive decision making, each of which has multiple 
subcomponents, explodes the notion that this style of review is nothing 
more than a party-crashing interloper at the table of constitutional law. 
CONCLUSION 
Semisubstantive reasoning pervades constitutional law.  Given this 
reality, analysts must begin to give these doctrines more systematic 
attention than they have received in the past.  In this Article, I have tried to 
push this process forward by exploring the many normative questions to 
which these rules give rise.  In the future, much debate about the wisdom, 
legitimacy, and proper shape of semisubstantive doctrines is certain to 
occur.  But if moderation is a virtue, as our greatest philosophers have 
taught,336 there is at least something to be said for the provisional, 
politically reversible style of decision making represented by this body of 
doctrine. 
What I have written about semisubstantive rules I offer in the spirit of 
tentativeness that a still-unfolding evaluation of a still-unfolding 
phenomenon deserves.  But about one thing my conclusions are not 
 
Court has] developed an almost inexhaustible arsenal of techniques and devices” that 
“engage the Court in a Socratic colloquy with the other institutions of government and with 
society as a whole concerning the necessity for this or that measure, for this or that 
compromise”). But see Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 331, 369 (arguing that the 
Court’s approach “is simply inconsistent with [its] own precedents” that have not been 
overruled). 
 330. See supra note 279. 
 331. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1823–28 (developing this argument). 
 332. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 333. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (“[W]here 
fundamental principles are overthrown . . . the legislative intention must be expressed with 
irresistible clearness . . . .”). 
 334. See supra notes 152–54, 224 and accompanying text (discussing Cooley v. Bd. of 
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819)). 
 335. See generally Coenen, supra note 11 (describing the Rehnquist Court’s widespread 
use of semisubstantive review). 
 336. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 111 (H. Rackham trans., 1968) (stating 
“that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean between 
two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that it is such a mean because it aims at 
hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions”). 
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tentative at all:  courts will continue to encounter invitations to take 
semisubstantive approaches to cases that come in many forms.  As judges 
grapple with these cases, they can only profit from what this Article invites 
others to help elaborate—a systematic evaluation of semisubstantive 
safeguards of constitutional limits on government power. 
 
